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Curtis A.  Bradley & Mitu Gulati  
 
Withdrawing from International Custom 
abstract. Treaties are negotiated, usually written down, and often subject to cumbersome 
domestic ratification processes. Nonetheless, nations often have the right to withdraw 
unilaterally from them. By contrast, the conventional wisdom is that nations never have the legal 
right to withdraw unilaterally from the unwritten rules of customary international law (CIL), a 
proposition that we refer to as the “Mandatory View.” It is not obvious, however, why it should 
be easier to exit from treaties than from CIL, especially given the significant overlap that exists 
today between the regulatory coverage of treaties and CIL, as well as the frequent use of treaties 
as evidence of CIL. In this Article, we consider both the intellectual history and functional 
desirability of the Mandatory View. We find that a number of international law publicists of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries thought that CIL rules were sometimes subject to unilateral 
withdrawal, at least if a nation gave notice about its intent. We also find that the Mandatory 
View did not come to dominate international law commentary until sometime in the twentieth 
century, and, even then, there were significant uncertainties about how the Mandatory View 
would work in practice. Moreover, we note that there are reasons to question the normative 
underpinnings of the shift to the Mandatory View, in that it may have been part of an effort to 
bind “uncivilized” states to the international law worked out by a small group of Western 
powers. After reviewing this history, we draw on theories developed with respect to contract law, 
corporate law, voting rules, and constitutional design to consider whether it is functionally 
desirable to restrict opt-out rights to the extent envisioned by the Mandatory View. We conclude 
that, although there are arguments for restricting opt-out in select areas of CIL, it is difficult to 
justify the Mandatory View as a general account of how CIL should operate. 
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There are two basic types of international law—treaties and customary 
international law (CIL). Treaties are negotiated, usually written down, and 
often subject to cumbersome domestic ratification processes. Nonetheless, 
nations often have the right to withdraw unilaterally from them. Many treaties 
expressly provide for a right of withdrawal, often with a notice requirement. As 
Professor Helfer has documented, “Treaty clauses that authorize exit are 
pervasive.”1 Indeed, these clauses exist even in treaties that reflect core 
principles of international public policy, such as the Geneva Conventions and 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.2 Moreover, treaties that do not address 
the issue of withdrawal may be found to allow implicitly for withdrawal, based, 
for example, on their subject matter.3 Even when a treaty does not generally 
permit withdrawal, nations may still have a right to withdraw in the event of a 
fundamental change of circumstances.4 
Unlike treaties, the rules of CIL do not arise from express negotiation, and 
they do not require any domestic act of ratification to become binding. 
Although these differences might suggest that nations should have greater 
flexibility to withdraw from rules of CIL than from treaties, the conventional 
wisdom is precisely the opposite. According to most international law scholars, 
a nation may have some ability to opt out of a CIL rule by persistent objection 
to the rule before the time of its formation (although even that proposition is 
contested), but once the rule becomes established, nations that are subject to it 
never have the right to withdraw unilaterally from it. Rather, if a nation wants 
to engage in a practice contrary to an established CIL rule, it must either violate 
 
1.  Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1582 (2005); see also, e.g., ARNOLD 
DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 510 (1961) (noting that the existence of an express 
treaty termination provision “occurs so frequently that it hardly requires illustration”). 
2.  See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. 10, done July 1, 1968, 21 
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (allowing withdrawal after three-months’ notice); Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 142, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (allowing withdrawal after one year’s notice). 
3.  See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 290-91 (2d ed. 2007); see also 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 56(1)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
I.L.M. 679 (stating that “[a] right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the 
nature of the treaty”). 
4.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347. 
This basis for withdrawal is a narrow one, and it is thought to be more restricted today than 
in the past, in part because of the prevalence of clauses either limiting the duration of 
treaties or expressly allowing for withdrawal. See, e.g., Gabíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 61 (Sept. 25); AUST, supra note 3, at 297-98. 
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the rule or enter into a treaty that overrides the rule as between the parties to 
the treaty. As explained by a committee of experts in its study of CIL for the 
International Law Association: 
  There is fairly widespread agreement that, even if there is a 
persistent objector rule in international law, it applies only when the 
customary rule is in the process of emerging. It does not, therefore, 
benefit States which came into existence only after the rule matured, or 
which became involved in the activity in question only at a later stage. 
Still less can it be invoked by those who existed at the time and were 
already engaged in the activity which is the subject of the rule, but 
failed to object at that stage. In other words, there is no “subsequent 
objector” rule.5  
We will refer to this as the “Mandatory View” of CIL. 
The contemporary international law literature contains almost no 
explanation for the Mandatory View. For the most part, the Mandatory View is 
simply stated as being canonical. It is not obvious, however, why it should be 
easier to exit from treaties than from CIL, especially given the significant 
regulatory overlap that exists today between treaties and CIL.6 Moreover, 
modern claims about the content of CIL often rely heavily on the content of 
treaties, especially multilateral treaties, even though many of these same 
treaties contain withdrawal clauses.7 There are also functional reasons to doubt 
the desirability of a mandatory conception of CIL, at least when applied across 
the board to all CIL issues.8 In addition, the Mandatory View is in tension with 
other aspects of CIL doctrine. In particular, if unilateral withdrawal from a CIL 
rule is so problematic, why are individual nations allowed to opt out of the 
rule, before it becomes established, through persistent objection? Conversely, if 
the persistent objector doctrine is needed in order to ensure that CIL is 
consensual, why does that consent rationale not also require the allowance of 
opt-out through subsequent objection? 
 
5.  INT’L LAW ASS’N, COMM. ON THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L LAW, STATEMENT 
OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 27 (2000). For similar statements, see, for example, 1 GEORG DAHM, JOST DELBRÜCK & 
RÜDIGER WOLFRUM, VÖLKERRECHT § 4(II)(2)(a), at 59 (2d ed. 1989); 1 JEAN-MARIE 
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
at xxxix (2005); 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts 
eds., 9th ed. 1992); and MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (6th ed. 2008). 
6.  See infra text accompanying note 20. 
7.  See infra text accompanying notes 40-41. 
8.  See infra Part IV. 
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The Mandatory View of CIL, it turns out, was not always as canonical as it 
is today. Rather, a number of prominent international law publicists of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries thought that CIL rules were at least 
sometimes subject to unilateral withdrawal. This was also the view of the early 
U.S. Supreme Court in some of its most famous CIL decisions. That is, 
publicists and the Court had in mind what we will call a “Default View” of CIL. 
Few contemporary scholars appear to be aware of this fact, and not one of the 
leading treatises or casebooks on international law mentions it. The Mandatory 
View did not come to dominate international law commentary until sometime 
in the twentieth century. Even then, there were substantial uncertainties about 
how the Mandatory View would operate, and CIL evolved in ways that are 
difficult to explain under that View. Modern commentators, however, invoke 
the Mandatory View without a sense of its intellectual history and without any 
effort to explain its justifications. 
Furthermore, there are reasons to question the normative underpinnings of 
the shift in the literature from the Default View to the Mandatory View. This 
shift appears to have occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, at a time when imperialism was at its height and most of Asia and 
Africa were under the control of the European powers. The “family of nations” 
was being expanded, but control over law creation was still largely in the hands 
of the so-called civilized nations, which meant primarily nations in Western 
Europe. Viewed in this context, the Mandatory View may have evolved as part 
of an effort to bind new nations and former colonies to international law rules 
that had already been worked out by a handful of powerful states.9 Later, when 
the new entrants into the system gained strength in numbers and the former 
powers became concerned that they might lose control of the process of law 
creation in the international arena, the Mandatory View was modified to allow 
for opting out of a CIL rule prior to the time that it became established.10 This 
right of opt-out, however, was crafted in such a way as to disallow new nations 
from opting out of any of the CIL rules that had developed before they came 
into the system. This history sits uneasily with contemporary assumptions in 
international law about sovereign equality and universality.11 
This Article considers the intellectual history and functional desirability of 
the Mandatory View. In Part I, we describe the modern understanding of CIL 
and explain how the Mandatory View fits within this understanding. In Part II, 
we document that a number of the leading international law publicists of the 
 
9.  See infra text accompanying notes 113-117. 
10.  See infra Section III.B. 
11.  See infra text accompanying note 117. 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries assumed that nations had the right to opt 
out of at least some CIL rules and that early decisions by the U.S. Supreme 
Court also reflected this view. In Part III, we trace the intellectual shift in the 
twentieth century toward the Mandatory View, and we further describe the 
substantial uncertainties that persisted about how CIL would operate under 
this View. Finally, in Parts IV and V, we consider the functional desirability of 
the Mandatory View and conclude that it is difficult to justify that View 
today—at least for all of CIL. In these parts, we draw on theories developed 
with respect to contract law, corporate law, voting rules, and constitutional 
design. 
If international law theory made room for some withdrawal rights under 
CIL, a number of consequences would follow. Nations that found that a CIL 
rule no longer addressed their needs would have an option other than simply 
violating it or attempting to bargain around it. Any withdrawal rights would 
need to be invoked publicly, presumably with reference to the purported CIL 
rule at issue and also perhaps to the reasons for withdrawal, thereby potentially 
increasing transparency and dialogue. Such withdrawal rights would also 
reduce the danger that multilateral treaties could create CIL that, unlike the 
underlying treaties, would lack an exit option. The potential “sovereignty 
costs” of establishing and joining such treaties would thereby be lower.12 At the 
same time, by allowing for differentiation in withdrawal rights among CIL 
rules, this approach would allow for the possibility that some CIL rules could 
be more mandatory than under the current one-size-fits-all approach (for 
example, by disallowing opt-out through prior persistent objection for some 
CIL rules). 
This is an important time to be thinking about CIL theory. The now-
widespread use of multilateral treaties as vehicles for international legislation 
raises questions about what role CIL should play in the international legal 
system and how this role relates to the one played by treaties. In addition, 
whereas historic claims about the content of CIL relied heavily on inductions 
from national practice, many modern claims rely instead on deductions from 
international pronouncements,13  a shift that may have implications for a variety 
of issues, including withdrawal rights. At the same time, there have been 
increasing challenges to CIL’s legitimacy and effectiveness, with some critics 
 
12.  See infra text accompanying note 249. 
13.  See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International 
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001) (discussing and attempting to reconcile 
traditional inductive CIL with modern deductive CIL). 
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arguing that CIL is no longer useful as a body of international law,14  and others 
arguing that it does not act as a constraint on national behavior.15 Unlike these 
critics, our goal is not to challenge CIL’s legitimacy, but rather to understand 
better how it does and should operate. If CIL theory made more room for a 
Default View, we believe that it might actually become stronger. In any event, 
the academic discourse about CIL would benefit from attention to the issue of 
withdrawal, and we hope that this Article can help initiate that discourse. 
i .  modern understanding of cil  
This Part provides background for the rest of the Article, especially for 
readers who are not international law experts. We summarize here the modern 
understanding of CIL and some of the debates and uncertainties that surround 
that understanding, and we explain how the Mandatory View fits with other 
aspects of CIL doctrine. 
Before the twentieth century, CIL was the principal form of international 
law. It was often referred to as part of the “law of nations,” a category that 
included both public international law (rights and duties between nations) and 
private international law (rules governing private international relationships 
and disputes, such as conflict-of-law principles, rules for enforcement of 
foreign judgments, and the “law merchant”).16 Issues regulated by the public 
law component of the law of nations included, for example, rights on the seas, 
conduct during wartime, and diplomatic immunity. 
There has since been a proliferation of treaties, both in quantity and range 
of subject matter, especially after the establishment of the United Nations 
system at the end of World War II. As a result, most of the major issue areas 
that were historically covered by CIL are now covered, to one degree or 
another, by treaties. For example, the Law of the Sea Convention addresses 
 
14.  See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 
452 (2000); see also John O. McGinnis, The Comparative Disadvantage of Customary 
International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7 (2006) (arguing that U.S. law should be 
preferred over CIL in light of CIL’s democratic deficits). 
15.  See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-43 
(2005). 
16.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 822 (1997); Stewart 
Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 821-22 
(1989). 
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rights on the seas,17 the Geneva Conventions address conduct during 
wartime,18 and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations addresses 
diplomatic immunity.19 Treaties also address numerous issues that were not 
historically regulated (at least extensively) by international law, including 
environmental conservation, the protection of human rights, and the 
prosecution of international crimes. CIL nevertheless continues to play an 
important role in international law and adjudication, regulating both within 
the gaps of treaties as well as the conduct of nonparties to the treaties.20 In 
addition, some longstanding CIL issues (such as the immunity of heads of state 
and limits on the extraterritorial application of national law) are still not 
regulated by any comprehensive treaties. Finally, newly emergent issues will 
often lack a treaty regime for a time. A possible (although contested) current 
example is the lack of a treaty addressing the standards for detention and trial 
of terrorists engaged in an armed conflict with a nation-state.21 
The standard definition of CIL is that it arises from the practices of nations 
followed out of a sense of legal obligation.22 Under this account, there are two 
elements to CIL: an objective state-practice element and a subjective sense-of-
legal-obligation (or opinio juris) element. This is the conventional definition, 
although some commentators have attempted to deemphasize the subjective 
 
17.  U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397. 
18.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 2, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
19.  Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
20.  See, e.g., BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 3-6 (2010); SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
78-86 (2006); Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of 
International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 238 (1996). 
21.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The United States, Israel and Unlawful Combatants, 12 GREEN BAG 
2D 397 (2009); John R. Crook, State Department Legal Advisor Finds Gaps in Legal Regime for 
Detention of Transnational Terrorists, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 346, 367-70 (2008). 
22.  See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
1060 (stating that one of the sources of international law to be applied by the International 
Court of Justice is “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) 
(1987) (defining CIL as the law of the international community that “results from a general 
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation”). 
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element23 and others have attempted to deemphasize the state-practice 
element.24 
Despite general agreement on the definition of CIL, there are many 
uncertainties surrounding this type of international law. It is not clear how 
much state practice is required in order to generate a rule of CIL, although 
most commentators agree that there must be “extensive”25 or “widespread”26 
practice among the states for which the practice is relevant.27 Nor is it clear how 
long nations must engage in the practice before it becomes a rule of CIL. 
Historically, CIL formation was thought to be an inherently slow process, but 
technological changes in communication, the rise of international institutions, 
and other developments are thought to have condensed the time period such 
that CIL can arise very quickly in some circumstances.28 Indeed, some 
commentators argue that there can be “instant” CIL.29 For these and other 
reasons, it can be difficult to determine when a CIL rule has developed. 
There are also questions about the subjective element of CIL. It is difficult 
to establish the subjective motivations of nation-states (or, more accurately, 
their leaders). The reasons that nations give publicly for doing something 
might not be their true reasons. Moreover, they often act without giving any 
particular reasons. There is also a circularity problem in requiring that nations 
act out of a sense of legal obligation before they become bound, since it is not 
clear how this sense of legal obligation would arise. In addition, some 
 
23.  See, e.g., INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 5, at 31-32; Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of 
Customary International Law, 272 RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 250 (1999). 
24.  Claims about international human rights law, for example, often deemphasize state practice. 
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 838-42 (describing this “New CIL”). For criticism 
of this tendency, see Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: 
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1989). 
25.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
102 cmt. b (1987). 
26.  See, e.g., INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 5, at 20. 
27.  IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (7th ed. 2008); MARK E. 
VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 29 (rev. 2d ed. 1997).  
28.  See, e.g., N. Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 74 (Feb. 20) 
(noting that “the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar 
to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was 
originally a purely conventional rule”); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (2d ed. 1993) (“At present . . . an international custom can arise 
even in a very short time.”). 
29.  See, e.g., Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International 
Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23, 35-40, 45-48 (1965); see also Andrew T. Guzman, 
Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 157-59 (2005) (discussing the 
concept of instant custom). 
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commentators are skeptical that nations follow practices out of a sense of legal 
obligation, as opposed to self-interest and coercion.30 Despite these problems 
with the subjective element, it might be difficult without that element to 
distinguish binding custom from practices followed for other reasons, such as 
habit, policy agreement with the practice, moral commitment, or an applicable 
treaty.31 
Once a rule of CIL has formed, the modern understanding is that it is 
binding on all states except those that have clearly and persistently objected to 
the rule prior to the time that it has “ripened” or “crystallized.”32 Persistent 
objection must involve affirmative international communications, not mere 
silence or adherence to contrary laws or practices, and there are few examples 
of agreed-upon successful persistent objection. Moreover, when a new state 
comes into being, either through decolonization or the breakup of another 
state, the new state is purportedly bound by all previously ripened rules of CIL, 
even though the new state did not have an opportunity to object. The complete 
disallowance of unilateral withdrawal from CIL is what we call the Mandatory 
View.33 
It is accepted that a CIL rule can be overridden by a later-in-time treaty, but 
only as between the parties to the treaty.34 In that case, the rule continues to 
bind nonparty states as well as parties in their relations with nonparty states. 
As a practical matter, therefore, the treaty-override option not only requires 
 
30.  See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 15, at 43 (arguing that CIL “is not an exogenous 
influence on state behavior”). 
31.  See, e.g., Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A Response to 
Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143, 178 (2001); see also N. Sea 
Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 44 (“The States concerned must therefore feel that they are 
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character 
of the acts is not in itself enough.”). 
32.  See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 15, at 23 (“Courts and scholars say that a long-
standing practice among states ‘ripens’ or ‘hardens’ into customary international law when 
it becomes accepted by states as legally binding.”); Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different 
Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 
458 (1985) (“A State that fails to object prior to the time that the rule finally crystallizes 
cannot claim exemption from it . . . .”). 
33.  We are considering here only legal doctrine. In light of the uncertain standards for CIL 
formation and the frequent lack of adjudicative and enforcement mechanisms for this body 
of law, it is arguable that nations have some de facto ability to exit from CIL by, for 
example, contesting the content of the rules. We consider this idea of de facto exit in Section 
V.B when discussing the rule-of-law argument for the Mandatory View. 
34.  See, e.g., PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
56 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (“Clearly a treaty, when it first comes into force, overrides customary 
law as between the parties to the treaty . . . .”). 
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obtaining the agreement of other nations, but also that the CIL obligation be 
such that a nation can differentiate in its conduct between parties to the treaty 
and nonparties. This will not be possible for some CIL obligations, such as 
those that concern the human rights obligations of a nation to its own citizens 
or the resource or environmental obligations of a nation with respect to 
something regarded as a global commons (such as the air, the seabed, or outer 
space). 
The only way for nations to change a rule of CIL (as opposed to overriding 
it by treaty) is to violate the rule and hope that other nations accept the new 
practice. As one commentator explained with approval, “Nations forge new law 
by breaking existing law, thereby leading the way for other nations to follow.”35 
Needless to say, there is tension between this idea and the idea of an 
international rule of law.36 Unlike for treaties, CIL is not typically described as 
allowing for withdrawal even when there has been a fundamental change of 
circumstances. 
A small set of international norms, which may or may not be a subset of 
CIL, has a special status. These norms, referred to as “peremptory norms” or 
“jus cogens norms,” are said to arise from nearly universal practice and to be 
absolute in their character, such that they do not permit any exceptions—even 
in times of emergency.37 Examples purportedly include prohibitions on 
 
35.  Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary 
International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 21 (1985); see also, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, The 
President and International Law: A Missing Dimension, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 375, 377 (1987) 
(“Existing customary law, then, contains the seeds of its own violation; otherwise it could 
never change itself.”); Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 
957 (2005) (“[C]ustomary international law is thought to be altered by acts that initially 
constitute violations of old rules; that is how it changes.”). 
36.  See, e.g., G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1983) 
(“It must be quite an extraordinary system of law which incorporates as its main, if not the 
only, vehicle for change the violation of its own provisions.”); Michael Akehurst, Custom as 
a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1974-75) (“There is no doubt that 
customary rules can be changed in this way, but the process is hardly one to be 
recommended by anyone who wishes to strengthen the rule of law in international 
relations.”). But cf. Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 
YALE J. INT’L L. 189, 193 (2006) (arguing that “noncompliance—particularly operational 
noncompliance—is a necessary component of less capable legal systems, including 
international law”). 
37.  See, e.g., Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International 
Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (1987); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory 
of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331 (2009); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, supra note 3, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344 (“For the purposes of the present 
Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
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genocide, slavery, and torture.38 Jus cogens norms cannot be overridden, even by 
treaty, and there is no right to opt out of them by prior persistent objection.39 
The only way in which these norms can be changed is through the 
development of a new conflicting jus cogens norm—something that is unlikely 
to occur. 
There is significant debate about the materials that are relevant in 
discerning the existence of a CIL (or jus cogens) rule. For example, although 
treaty and CIL obligations frequently overlap, there is debate over whether and 
to what extent treaties can serve as evidence of CIL.40 Nevertheless, claims 
about the content of CIL often rely heavily on the content of treaties.41 There is 
also debate over whether and to what extent nonbinding resolutions 
promulgated by international bodies, such as the U.N. General Assembly (in 
which each nation has one vote), have evidentiary value.42 In practice, due to 
resource, expertise, and other constraints, few adjudicatory bodies conduct 
anything like a 192-nation survey of state practice in deciding whether to 
recognize and apply a rule of CIL. It is also common in academic commentary 
to see claims about the content of CIL that are not based on empirical evidence 
of state practices.43 
 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.”).  
38.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 
cmt. n (1987). 
39.  See, e.g., id. § 102 cmt. k; Holning Lau, Comment, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine 
in International Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 495, 498 (2005). 
40.  See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, International Agreements and the Development of Customary 
International Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971 (1986); Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral 
Treaties and the Formation of Customary International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 71 
(1996); Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1988). 
41.  See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 15, at 23 (“Treaties, especially multilateral 
treaties, but also bilateral ones, are often used as evidence of customary international law, 
but in an inconsistent way.”); R.R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary 
International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 275, 275 (1965-66) (“Both multilateral and bilateral 
treaties are not infrequently cited as evidence of the state of customary international law.”). 
42.  See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 85 (1991); see also, 
e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
254-55 (July 8) (“[General Assembly resolutions] can, in certain circumstances, provide 
evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio 
juris.”). 
43.  See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Panel Discussion, Scholars in the Construction and Critique of 
International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 317, 318 (2000). 
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Running through all these uncertainties and debates surrounding CIL are 
questions about whether it can or should be grounded in state consent.44 In an 
international system that lacks a central sovereign government, some 
commentators argue that the consent of nation-states is a prerequisite for the 
binding force of international law.45 Other commentators dismiss consent as 
the touchstone for the legitimacy of CIL, noting (among other things) that it is 
difficult to reconcile the modern understanding of CIL with any meaningful 
conception of state consent.46 
Whatever the proper role of consent in international law, CIL (as it is 
currently conceived) is less consensual than treaty-based law. Treaties bind 
only nations that have affirmatively ratified them, and, as discussed, nations 
often have the ability to withdraw from treaties, albeit sometimes with a notice 
requirement.47 CIL, by contrast, binds new states regardless of their consent 
and binds existing states based merely on their silence. There is also no 
unilateral right of withdrawal. Jus cogens norms are even less consensual. 
In the United States, debates about CIL intersect with debates over its 
domestic status. Even though treaties are expressly negotiated and must receive 
the approval of the President and a supermajority of the Senate, many of them 
are not “self-executing” and thus can be enforced in U.S. courts only if they are 
implemented by legislation enacted by Congress.48 By contrast, even though 
CIL engages much less with U.S. democratic processes than do treaties, many 
international law commentators claim that CIL is automatically self-executing 
federal law that (among other things) preempts inconsistent state law.49 In 
 
44.  See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 14, at 473-75, 508-24 (discussing problems with consent-based 
accounts of CIL). 
45.  See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 27 (1995); MARK 
WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (5th ed. 2008); see also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7) (“The rules of law binding upon States therefore 
emanate from their own free will . . . .”). 
46.  See, e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 51-54 (6th ed. 1963); Kelly, supra note 14, at 
508-16. 
47.  See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. Furthermore, when nations ratify a treaty they often 
have the right to opt out of particular provisions in the treaty through the attachment of 
reservations to their ratifications. See AUST, supra note 3, 100-30. 
48.  See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506-19 (2008) (discussing considerations relevant 
to determining whether a treaty provision is self-executing); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-
Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131 (same). 
49.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 
111 cmt. d, 115 cmt. e (1987); Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive 
Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 295, 303-04, 332 n.109; Louis Henkin, 
International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1561 (1984); Harold 
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support of this proposition, these commentators often rely on nineteenth-
century and early twentieth-century statements that the law of nations is “part 
of our law.”50 Debates over CIL also arise in connection with international 
human rights litigation brought in U.S. courts, especially litigation brought 
under the Alien Tort Statute, in which foreign citizens sue foreign government 
officials and other defendants for alleged violations of the CIL of human 
rights.51 
This Article focuses on the legal authority of nations to withdraw from 
rules of CIL. The issue of withdrawal is hardly the only theoretical puzzle 
surrounding CIL. Professor D’Amato observed in his 1971 book on CIL that 
“[t]he questions of how custom comes into being and how it can be changed or 
modified are wrapped in mystery and illogic.”52 More recently, Professor 
Guzman noted that “CIL has no coherent or agreed upon theory to justify its 
role or explain its doctrine.”53 The Mandatory View of CIL is particularly 
worthy of study, however, because unlike the other puzzles it has gone largely 
unexamined and sits so incongruously with the widespread exit rights available 
under treaties. 
i i .  historical support for a default view of cil 
The Mandatory View of CIL was not always the canonical view. Rather, a 
number of prominent international law publicists of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries thought that CIL rules were at least sometimes subject to 
unilateral withdrawal. This was also the view of the early U.S. Supreme Court 
in some of its most famous CIL decisions. CIL was, in other words, viewed in 
some instances as merely a default—that is, it was viewed as binding only until 
 
Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 
1846-47 (1998). 
50.  See, e.g., Koh, supra note 49, at 1831; Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to 
Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. 
Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2255-57 (2004). 
51.  See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (allowing claims to be brought 
under the Alien Tort Statute based on CIL norms that are specifically defined and widely 
accepted); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing Paraguayan citizens 
to sue a former Paraguayan police inspector under the Alien Tort Statute for torture 
committed in Paraguay). 
52.  ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1971). 
53.  Guzman, supra note 29, at 117. For similar observations, see, for example, MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 409 (1989); Kelly, supra note 14, at 516; and Edward T. Swaine, Rational 
Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 563 (2002). 
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such time as a nation adequately announced that it no longer intended to 
continue adhering to the rule. Sometimes a period of notice might be required 
to protect reliance interests, but otherwise there was a right of unilateral 
withdrawal. We call this the “Default View” of CIL. To be clear, we are not 
claiming that the Default View was necessarily the only perspective. Rather, 
our claim is simply that the Mandatory View was not always the exclusive view 
of CIL and that there was at least some support historically for an alternate 
view that would allow for greater exit rights. This alternate view is not 
mentioned in any of the modern treatises or casebooks on international law.54 
Consider first the classic international law publicists. Despite the influence 
of natural law theory during the eighteenth century (which, if anything, would 
be expected to lead to a less flexible view of CIL), many of the international law 
treatise-writers of that period did not subscribe to the Mandatory View of CIL. 
The influential eighteenth-century Swiss commentator, Emmerich de Vattel, 
described the “customary law of nations” as follows: 
  When a custom or usage has become generally established either 
between all the civilized countries of the world or only between those of 
a given continent, Europe for example, or those which have more 
frequent intercourse with one another, if this custom be indifferent in 
nature, much more so if it be useful and reasonable, it becomes binding 
upon all those nations which are regarded as having given their consent 
to it. They are bound to observe it towards one another, so long as they 
have not expressly declared their unwillingness to follow it any longer.55  
Vattel elaborated on this point when discussing ambassadorial privileges 
and immunities, and here it is worth quoting him at length: 
 
54.  Professor Dodge discusses some of this history in the context of considering the 
relationship, in U.S. domestic law, between treaties and CIL. See William S. Dodge, 
Customary International Law in U.S. Courts: Origins of the Later-in-Time Rule, in MAKING 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV 
VAGTS 531 (Pieter H.F. Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer & Michael Waibel eds., forthcoming 2010) 
(on file with authors). There is also a brief reference to what we are calling the Default View 
in an article by Professor Kelly. See Kelly, supra note 14, at 509-10. 
55.  EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED 
TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS, intro., § 26, at 9 
(photo. reprint 1993) (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758) 
(emphasis added). Vattel was influenced by the work of Christian Wolff, a German 
philosopher, who described the customary law of nations as resting “upon the tacit consent 
of nations.” 2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM 18-
19 (Joseph H. Drake trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1749). 
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Let us examine . . . what obligation custom or received usage can 
impose upon Nations, not only in matters relating to ministers, but also 
in other matters in general. No usages or customs of other Nations can 
bind an independent State, except in so far as that State has given its 
express or implied consent to them. But when a custom, indifferent in 
itself, has been once established and received, it is binding upon 
Nations which have expressly or tacitly adopted it. However, if any of 
them happens to find at a later time that the custom is disadvantageous, 
it is free to declare that it is unwilling to abide by such a custom; and 
once it has clearly made known its intention there is no room for 
complaint on the part of others if it does not observe the custom. But 
such an intention should be known in advance, at a time when no 
particular Nation will be affected by the new rule; it is too late to make 
the change when a case in point has already arisen.56  
Thus, according to Vattel, a customary rule of international law was binding on 
nations that had tacitly accepted it, but these nations nevertheless had an 
ability to opt out of the rule if they later found it to be disadvantageous, so long 
as they gave advance notice of their intention. Other classic European 
international law publicists, such as Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Cornelius 
Bynkershoek, and Georg von Martens, expressed the same basic idea.57 
To be sure, Vattel did not think that nations had the right to withdraw 
from all international law rules. In addition to treaties and custom, Vattel 
referred to a category of international law that he termed the “voluntary” law of 
 
56.  VATTEL, supra note 55, bk. IV, § 106, at 385-86. 
57.  See, e.g., J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW IN WHICH THE TRUE SYSTEMS 
OF MORALITY AND CIVIL GOVERNMENT ARE ESTABLISHED 199 (Nugent trans., Dublin, John 
Rice 1791) (1718) (“There is, besides, another law of nations, which we may call arbitrary 
and free, as founded only on an express or tacit convention; the effect of which is not by 
itself universal; being obligatory only in regard to those who have voluntarily submitted 
thereto, and only as long as they please, because they are always at liberty to change or 
repeal it.”); CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE FORO LEGATORUM LIBER SINGULARIS: A 
MONOGRAPH ON THE JURISDICTION OVER AMBASSADORS IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
CASES, ch. XIX, at 106-07 (photo. reprint 1995) (Gordon J. Laing trans., William S. Hein & 
Co. 1946) (1744) (“The law of nations is nothing but a presumption based on custom, nor 
has this presumption any validity in the face of a definitely expressed wish on the part of 
him who is concerned.”); G.F. VON MARTENS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, 
FOUNDED ON THE TREATIES AND CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE 356 
(William Cobbett trans., London, Cobbett & Morgan 1802) (1788) (“As to rights founded 
on simple custom, each power may discontinue them whenever it makes a timely 
declaration, either express or tacit of its intention so to do.”
 
). For more on Bynkershoek, see 
infra note 161. 
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nations.58 Although Vattel described this category as stemming from the 
presumed consent of nations (hence the term voluntary), he did not suggest 
that nations could unilaterally withdraw their consent.59 For this voluntary 
law-of-nations category, Vattel had in mind the protection of what he called 
the “perfect rights” of nations, which included rights of security and 
governance.60 Vattel noted, however, that “care must be taken not to extend 
these rights so as to prejudice the liberty of Nations.”61 
The key point for present purposes is that Vattel and other classic publicists 
thought that nations could withdraw from at least some CIL rules. This 
proposition was repeated and endorsed in numerous nineteenth-century 
international law treatises, in both the United States and Great Britain, 
sometimes with the observation that notice may in some instances be required 
prior to withdrawal from a CIL rule. For example, the American publicist 
Henry Wheaton, writing in 1845, endorsed the view of Bynkershoek that “[t]he 
law of nations is only a presumption founded upon usage; and every such 
presumption ceases the moment the will of the party is declared to the 
contrary.”62 As a result, Wheaton argued that a nation could decline to give the 
diplomatic immunity accorded by the law of nations, “provided it openly 
declares its intention so to act.”63 Similarly, in his commentary on Vattel 
published in 1856, the British barrister Joseph Chitty added the following 
footnote to Vattel’s statement concerning a right to withdraw from a 
customary rule: “There must be a reasonable notification, in point of time, of 
 
58.  See VATTEL, supra note 55, intro., § 21, at 8. 
59.  See id. Vattel explained that even if nations did not actually consent to the voluntary law of 
nations, natural law would effectively supply their consent, and that “the Nation which 
would refuse to consent would violate the common rights of all Nations.” Id., bk. III, § 192, 
at 306. 
60.  See id., intro., § 17, at 7. Breaches of perfect rights were subject to sanction by other nations, 
including through the use of military force. Id. § 22, at 8. A right that would otherwise be 
imperfect could become perfect through a treaty or through custom, but such a perfected 
right would be subject to the limitations inherent in treaties and custom, including the right 
to opt out of custom. Id. §§ 24-26, at 8-9. 
61.  Id. § 23, at 8. Vattel also referred to the “necessary” law of nations, which consisted of 
principles derived from natural law. But he viewed this category as binding on nations only 
as a matter of their internal conscience, not as a matter of external law. See id. § 28, at 9. 
62.  HENRY WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 196 (New 
York, Gould Books & Co. 1845); see also id. at 96. 
63.  Id. at 195. 
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the intention not to be bound by the customary law.”64 In 1861, Henry Halleck, 
a U.S. Army general and accomplished lawyer, recited Vattel’s proposition 
about withdrawal and noted that “[c]ustoms which are lawful and innocent are 
binding upon the states which have adopted them,” while also emphasizing that 
the right to withdraw from a CIL rule did not apply to “what [Vattel] calls the 
voluntary law of nations, which is founded on general usage or implied 
consent.”65 Similar suggestions of at least a qualified opt-out right under CIL 
appear in other treatises up through the end of the nineteenth century.66 
Modern commentators, while often paying homage to the views of these 
publicists in other ways, seem to be unaware of these statements.67 
Early U.S. Supreme Court decisions also envisioned that CIL rules were 
binding only on nations that continued to accept them.68 Take, for example, 
 
64.  EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, preliminaries, § 26, at 
lxvi n.9 (Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1856) (1758). 
65.  H.W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW; OR, RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES 
IN PEACE AND WAR 48-49 (San Francisco, H.H. Bancroft & Co. 1861) (emphasis added). 
Subsequent editions of Halleck’s treatise, revised and edited by Sherston Baker, including 
the fourth edition published in 1908, contained similar language. See 1 HALLECK’S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 55-56 (G. Sherston Baker ed., 4th ed., 1908). 
66.  See, e.g., SHERSTON BAKER, FIRST STEPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW §6, at 16 (London, Kagan 
Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1899) (“Customs which are lawful and innocent are binding 
upon the States which have adopted them . . . .”) (emphasis added); 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, 
COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (London, Butterworths 3d ed. 1879) (stating 
that nations should not “lightly depart[]” from customary rules and “never without due 
notice conveyed to other countries”); ARCHER POLSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 
12 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1860) (“It is competent to any nation, that so 
pleases it, to renounce any of her customs, and so to exempt herself from the jurisdiction of 
such portions of the law of nations as those customs warrant . . . .”). The treatises were not 
perfectly uniform on this point. For a suggestion in the late 1880s of something like the 
Mandatory View, see WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press 1880), which states that the United States could eventually become bound, even 
without its consent, to the abolition of privateering in the Declaration of Paris, as a result of 
the “persistent opinions” of other states.  
67.  See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of 
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 484-85 (1989) (relying on Vattel); Beth Stephens, The Law of 
Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 
401 (1997) (same). 
68.  Vattel’s treatise was very influential in early U.S. history and was frequently relied upon by 
the Supreme Court. See DANIEL GEORGE LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: 
THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER 13-33 (1985); Charles G. Fenwick, The 
Authority of Vattel, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1913); Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the 
Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1061-
67 (2002). 
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the Court’s first significant foreign relations law decision, Ware v. Hylton, in 
which the Court considered the propriety of the state of Virginia’s confiscation 
during the Revolutionary War of debts owed to British creditors.69 While 
ultimately concluding that the confiscation violated the 1783 peace treaty with 
Great Britain, the Court held that there was no basis for undoing the seizure 
based on CIL. At that time, the Supreme Court Justices wrote their opinions 
seriatim, and Justice Chase, writing the most extensive opinion, explained that 
although European nations had adopted a custom disallowing the confiscation 
of debts owed to enemy aliens, the state of Virginia was free to pursue a 
different practice. Justice Chase noted that there were three types of law of 
nations rules: general, conventional, and customary. The customary law of 
nations, Justice Chase said, “is founded on tacit consent; and is only obligatory 
on those nations, who have adopted it.”70 As a result, he concluded that the 
customary restriction on confiscating private debts followed by European 
nations “was not binding on the state of Virginia, because founded on custom 
only; and she was at liberty to reject, or adopt the custom, as she pleased.”71 
Similarly, one of the lawyers for the Virginia debtors, citing Vattel, emphasized 
that “the conventional, or customary, law of nations is only obligatory on those 
nations by whom it is adopted.”72 
Consider also the Court’s 1812 decision in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.73 
In that case, the Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Marshall, held 
 
69.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
70.  Id. at 227 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
71.  Id. In theory this statement would also be consistent with a narrower opt-out right that 
would apply only to new states, but we have not found any support in the literature of that 
period for limiting the opt-out right in that manner. Justice Iredell suggested a different 
reason why the purported customary rule against seizing enemy property did not apply to 
the conflict with Great Britain: the fact that Great Britain did not recognize the United 
States as a sovereign entity and “sought to destroy their very existence as an independent 
people.” Id. at 263 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
72.  Id. at 215 (opinion of Chase, J.). Support for an opt-out right from the customary law of 
nations can also be found in Rutgers v. Waddington, an important preconstitutional decision 
by the Mayor’s Court in New York, in which Alexander Hamilton represented a British 
defendant in a trespass case relating to the occupation of a business establishment in New 
York during the Revolutionary War. In addressing the defendant’s argument that the 
application of the New York trespass statute to this situation would violate international 
law, the court rejected the claim that nations are always disallowed from opting out of CIL: 
“[W]hen this doctrine is applied in general to all customs, which prevail by tacit consent as 
part of the law of nations; we do not find that [it] is warranted by authorities.” SELECT 
CASES OF THE MAYOR’S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, 1674-1784, at 315 (Richard B. Morris ed., 
1935). 
73.  11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
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that private individuals could not (in effect) sue France to recover a vessel that 
they said had been unlawfully taken by France during wartime.74 In concluding 
that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, the Court did not say that the 
United States was disallowed from withdrawing from CIL rules of sovereign 
immunity. Instead, the Court, in language that most commentators have 
passed over, explained that the CIL sovereign immunity rules applied to the 
United States because it had not announced before receiving the ship in 
question that it disagreed with the CIL rules: “A nation would justly be 
considered as violating its faith, although that faith might not be expressly 
plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its 
territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received 
obligations of the civilized world.”75 Because of the lack of such notice, 
reasoned the Court, the United States had implicitly given France a promise 
that the usual CIL rules would apply: 
[T]he Exchange, being a public armed ship, in the service of a foreign 
sovereign, with whom the government of the United States is at peace, 
and having entered an American port open for her reception, on the 
terms on which ships of war are generally permitted to enter the ports 
of a friendly power, must be considered as having come into the 
American territory, under an implied promise, that while necessarily 
within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she should be 
exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.76 
The Court’s statements were consistent with the arguments of the federal 
government attorney who appeared in the case to argue for France’s immunity. 
This attorney, Alexander Dallas, who had previously served as the first reporter 
of decisions for the Supreme Court, acknowledged that a nation could “change 
the public law as to foreign nations, upon giving notice” and that consent of a 
foreign nation to be sued could be inferred where a domestic law “previously 
 
74.  As a “libel” action in admiralty, the case was technically brought against the vessel rather 
than the nation of France. 
75.  11 U.S. at 137 (emphasis added). 
76.  Id. at 147 (emphasis added); see also id. at 141 (“If, for reasons of state, the ports of a nation 
generally, or any particular ports be closed against vessels of war generally, or the vessels of 
any particular nation, notice is usually given of such determination. If there be no 
prohibition, the ports of a friendly nation are considered as open to the public ships of all 
powers with whom it is at peace, and they are supposed to enter such ports and to remain in 
them while allowed to remain, under the protection of the government of the place.”). 
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provides and changes the law of nations.”77 Subsequent sovereign immunity 
decisions from the early 1800s contain similar reasoning.78 
The Supreme Court’s default conception of CIL has a potential connection 
to U.S. separation-of-powers considerations, and thus to controversies 
surrounding the status of CIL within the U.S. legal system.79 This potential 
connection is illustrated by another seizure of enemy property decision—this 
time from the War of 1812. In Brown v. United States, the Court considered 
whether the executive branch had the authority to seize property in the United 
States owned by British citizens.80 In concluding that it did not, the Court, 
citing Vattel and other international law commentators, noted that “[t]he 
modern rule then would seem to be, that tangible property belonging to an 
enemy and found in the country at the commencement of war, ought not to be 
immediately confiscated; and in almost every commercial treaty an article is 
inserted stipulating for the right to withdraw such property.”81 Although the 
Court acknowledged that the United States had the ability to opt out of this 
custom, it reasoned that this opt-out decision should be made specifically by 
Congress, which could take into account the reciprocity implications: 
The rule which we apply to the property of our enemy, will be applied 
by him to the property of our citizens. Like all other questions of policy, 
it is proper for the consideration of a department which can modify it at 
will; not for the consideration of a department which can pursue only 
 
77.  Id. at 123.  
78.  See, e.g., The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 352-54 (1822) (citing Schooner 
Exchange for the proposition that the exemption of foreign state vessels from a nation’s 
jurisdiction “stands upon principles of public comity and convenience, and arises from the 
presumed consent or license of nations [and that] as such consent and license is implied 
only from the general usage of nations, it may be withdrawn upon notice at any time, 
without just offence”). Even with respect to the highly normative issue of the slave trade, 
the Marshall Court concluded that nations could not be bound against their will to evolving 
norms against the trade. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825) (“As no 
nation can prescribe a rule for others, none can make a law of nations; and this traffic 
remains lawful to those whose governments have not forbidden it.”). 
79.  For a description of these controversies, see Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David 
H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 869, 881-91 (2007). 
80.  See 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). 
81.  Id. at 125. Vattel explained that citizens of the enemy state who had come into the host state 
before the initiation of the war would have done so “in reliance upon the public faith,” with 
the host state having “impliedly promised them full liberty and security for their return 
home.” VATTEL, supra note 55, bk. III, § 63, at 256. 
  
withdrawing from international custom 
223 
 
the law as it is written. It is proper for the consideration of the 
legislature, not of the executive or judiciary.82  
As Professors Bellia and Clark have explained, this decision is part of a larger 
pattern of U.S. decisions in which the domestic application of CIL has 
historically been tied to separation-of-powers considerations.83 What even 
Professors Bellia and Clark fail to notice, however, is that the decision concerns 
not merely the allocation of authority to implement a CIL rule, but also the 
allocation of authority to opt out of a CIL rule.84 
The opt-out idea may also help explain other important Supreme Court 
decisions concerning CIL. Indeed, it arguably sheds light on what is perhaps 
the Court’s most famous decision applying CIL, The Paquete Habana decision 
in 1900.85 In that case, the Court concluded that there was a CIL rule barring 
the seizure of unarmed coastal fishing vessels during wartime, and it ordered 
the U.S. Navy to pay compensation for seizing and selling two such vessels 
during the Spanish-American War. In an oft-quoted sentence, the Court 
observed that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained 
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination.”86 The Court also made clear, however, that it should apply the 
“customs and usages of civilized nations” only “where there is no treaty, and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision.”87 
 
82.  12 U.S. at 128-29 (emphasis added). Importantly, Marshall did not say that a deviation from 
the customary rule by Congress would place the United States in breach of international 
law. Instead, he said that it was likely to result in the adoption of a similar practice by the 
other nation and thus raise policy concerns best addressed by the legislature. In dissent, 
Justice Story argued that there was in fact no customary rule prohibiting the seizure of 
enemy property. See id. at 145-46 (Story, J., dissenting). 
83.  See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70-72 (2009). 
84.  In 1795, when defending a provision in the Jay Treaty with Great Britain that prohibited the 
confiscation of enemy property and debts, Alexander Hamilton had argued that the United 
States was already bound by a CIL rule to the same effect because, “when [it was] a member 
of the British Empire, [it was] a party to that law, and not having dissented from it when they 
became independent they are to be considered as having continued a party to it.” ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, To Defence No. XX (Oct. 23-24, 1795), in 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 341 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973) (emphasis added). 
85.  175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
86.  Id. at 700. 
87.  Id. 
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The qualifying language in The Paquete Habana has long divided and 
puzzled commentators.88 This language is generally interpreted as referring to 
the domestic institutions that can violate CIL on behalf of the United States. 
While that might be what the Court had in mind, it is not clear from that 
explanation why the Court indicated that CIL should not be applied in the face 
of domestic judicial precedent to the contrary. Even the reference to a 
controlling executive act raises questions, since it is often assumed that only 
Congress, not the executive, has the authority to override treaties for the 
United States.89 
A possible explanation for this qualifying language in The Paquete Habana 
is that the Court viewed the CIL rule in question as binding on the United 
States only to the extent that the country had not opted out of it, and the Court 
thought that for that particular CIL rule, any of the three branches of the 
federal government would have the authority to make the opt-out decision. 
The U.S. government had argued that the decision whether to exempt fishing 
vessels from seizure was discretionary with the executive, and that such an 
exemption would require either a treaty “or some specific ordinance or 
proclamation by which the executive shows an exercise of discretion in favor of 
the property claimed to be exempted.”90 The Court appears to have in effect 
reversed this proposed presumption, concluding that the vessels were immune 
absent some treaty or unilateral public act to the contrary. 
Importantly, the Court in The Paquete Habana expressly tied its holding 
back to the separation-of-powers analysis in Brown (a decision in which, as 
noted, the Court assumed a U.S. ability to opt out of the custom): 
The decision [in Brown] that enemy property on land, which by the 
modern usage of nations is not subject to capture as prize of war, 
cannot be condemned by a prize court, even by direction of the 
executive, without express authority from Congress, appears to us to 
repel any inference that coast fishing vessels, which are exempt by the 
general consent of civilized nations from capture, and which no act of 
Congress or order of the President has expressly authorized to be taken 
 
88.  See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary 
International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 321, 324 (1985) 
(noting that “The Paquete Habana has generated extensive disagreement as to whether the 
President may violate international law”); Louis Henkin, The President and International 
Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 930, 931 (1986) (noting that “[w]e can only speculate as to what the 
Court meant”). 
89.  See, e.g., Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 154-69 (2004). 
90.  Brief for the United States at 11, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (No. 395). 
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and confiscated, must be condemned by a prize court, for want of a 
distinct exemption in a treaty or other public act of the Government.91  
The Court thus seems to be equating an opt-out pursuant to a unilateral public 
act of the government with an “exemption” authorized by a treaty. This opt-
out possibility may also explain why the Court went out of its way in The 
Paquete Habana to make clear that the United States had accepted the CIL rule 
exempting coastal fishing boats from capture, both historically and during the 
war in question.92 The claimants had also emphasized this point at the 
beginning of the argument section of their brief.93 To be clear, we are not 
arguing that this is the only possible reading of the decision—just that it is an 
available reading that becomes apparent when one understands the Default 
View that was common in the nineteenth century. As far as we are aware, no 
other commentator has noticed this possible reading of The Paquete Habana.94 
In sum, contrary to what most commentators assume, the Mandatory View 
of CIL has not always been the canonical view, at least as an account of how all 
of CIL operates. Many leading eighteenth- and nineteenth-century publicists 
 
91.  175 U.S. at 711 (emphasis added). The Court also relied on Wheaton’s international law 
treatise, which endorses the Default View. See id. at 700-01; see also supra notes 62-63 and 
accompanying text. 
92.  See id. at 696-99 (documenting U.S. acceptance of the rule during the Mexican-American 
War); id. at 712-14 (documenting President McKinley’s desire to conduct the Spanish-
American War consistent with established principles of CIL); see also The Lottawanna, 88 
U.S. 558, 572 (1874) (explaining that maritime law “is only so far operative as law in any 
country as it is adopted by the laws and usages of that country” and that “[i]n this respect it 
is like international law or the laws of war, which have the effect of law in no country any 
further than they are accepted and received as such”). 
93.  See Brief for Claimants, Appellants at 7, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (No. 395) (“In 
short, the United States publicly declared that its policy was in full accord with the 
principles of modern international law.”); see also id. at 35 (“There is nothing in the records 
to suggest that the boats or their crews were in any respect different from those as to which 
a well-defined practice exists, and the President having especially invoked such practice for 
the guidance of all persons, including the courts, the vessels should receive the immunity it 
affords.”). 
94.  Professor Dodge claims that, by the time of The Paquete Habana decision, there had already 
been a shift to what we are calling the Mandatory View. See Dodge, supra note 54, at 555. 
Dodge does not offer direct evidence to support this conclusion. He notes that there is a 
reference in The Paquete Habana to the “general consent of the civilized nations,” id. 
(quoting 175 U.S. at 708), but similar language had appeared in earlier decisions when there 
was still support in the literature for a Default View of at least some of CIL. See, e.g., The 
Scotia, 81 U.S. 170, 187 (1871) (“Like all the laws of nations, [the law of the sea] rests upon 
the common consent of civilized communities.”). 
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did not subscribe to it. Nor did the U.S. Supreme Court in some of its most 
famous nineteenth-century CIL decisions. 
That said, a couple of caveats are in order. First, although we rely on 
treatises from Europe, the judicial precedent that we describe is drawn from 
the United States. Hence, it is possible that the Default View was accepted 
more in the United States than elsewhere. Even assuming that this turned out 
to be the case, it would still show that the Mandatory View was not as 
uniformly accepted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as it is today. A 
second caveat is that the history recounted does not, by itself, dictate any 
particular conclusions about how CIL should operate in the modern era. Our 
claim about its relevance is simply that it shows that the Mandatory View is not 
the only possible approach to CIL, and that an international legal system could 
potentially operate despite the allowance of some CIL withdrawal rights. In 
any event, only by having a sense of this history can one begin to consider why 
the Mandatory View eventually became conventional wisdom, an issue to 
which we now turn. 
i i i .  shift to the mandatory view 
At some point, the Mandatory View became conventional wisdom. In 1969, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in its North Sea Continental Shelf 
decision that “customary law rules . . . must have equal force for all members of 
the international community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right 
of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its own 
favour.”95 More recently, there has been almost unquestioning acceptance of 
the Mandatory View. Writing in 1985, for example, Professor Charney asserted 
that “[n]o authority would permit a State unilaterally to opt out of an existing 
rule of customary international law.”96 In this Part, we attempt to identify the 
reasons for this shift, and we consider the relationship between this shift and 
the modern persistent objector doctrine. 
A. Timing of and Reasons for the Shift 
It is difficult to know precisely when the shift to the Mandatory View 
occurred. It appears that there was increasing support in the treatises for this 
view near the end of the nineteenth century. For example, the British lawyer, 
John Westlake, stated in 1894 that: 
 
95.  N. Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den., F.R.G./Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38-39 (Feb. 20). 
96.  Charney, supra note 35, at 2. 
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  The consent of the international society to the rules prevailing in it 
is the consent of the men who are the ultimate members of that society. 
When one of those rules is invoked against a state, it is not necessary to 
show that the state in question has assented to the rule either 
diplomatically or by having acted on it, though it is a strong argument 
if you can do so. It is enough to show that the general consensus of 
opinion within the limits of European civilisation is in favour of the 
rule.97 
A more significant endorsement of the Mandatory View came eleven years 
later, in Lassa Oppenheim’s famous and influential treatise. Oppenheim stated: 
[N]o State which is a member of the Family of Nations can at some 
time or another declare that it will in future no longer submit to a 
certain recognised rule of the Law of Nations. The body of the rules of 
this law can be altered by common consent only, not by a unilateral 
declaration on the part of one State.98 
Oppenheim cited nothing in support of this statement, so it is unclear whether 
or to what extent he thought the proposition was settled. The same year that 
his treatise was published, a British court suggested that at least some rules of 
CIL had to be accepted by Britain before they would be binding. In a case 
involving a claim that, after its takeover of the South African Republic, Britain 
was obligated to honor the private contractual obligations of the prior 
government, the court reasoned that in order for there to be “satisfactory 
evidence” of a CIL rule binding on Britain, there would need to be a showing 
“that the particular proposition put forward has been recognised and acted 
upon by our own country, or that it is of such a nature, and has been so widely 
and generally accepted, that it can hardly be supposed that any civilized State 
would repudiate it.”99 
Absent other evidence, the date of the publication of Oppenheim’s 
treatise—1905—might seem like a reasonable date for marking the shift in the 
 
97.  JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1894). 
98.  1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 18 (1905). Oppenheim was a German 
scholar who taught in England, first at the London School of Economics and then at the 
University of Cambridge. See Charles Noble Gregory, In Memoriam, Professor Oppenheim, 
14 AM. J. INT’L L. 229 (1920). 
99.  W. Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B. 391 at 407. For an earlier British 
decision with similar reasoning, see R v. Keyn, [1876] 2 Exch. Div. 63, 202 (Lord Cockburn 
C.J.) (“To be binding, the law must have received the assent of the nations who are to be 
bound by it.”). 
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literature toward the Mandatory View. On the other hand, there are reasons to 
believe that the shift may have occurred later. For example, statements by the 
delegates at various diplomatic conferences, such as at the Hague Codification 
Conference of 1930, suggest that at least some nations continued to support the 
Default View.100 In addition, well after the publication of Oppenheim’s 
treatise, there continued to be substantial support in the literature for a 
“voluntarist” conception of international law.101 Under that conception, 
international law could only bind states if they had expressly or implicitly 
agreed with it, a proposition that is not readily compatible with the Mandatory 
View.102 It is not clear precisely when the voluntarist conception was replaced 
(if it ever was), although some commentators suggest that this happened by 
the end of World War II.103 Even after World War II, Soviet commentators 
advocated the voluntarist conception, and, relatedly, a Default View of CIL.104 
Voluntarism was also advocated in the post-World War II period by newly 
independent states.105 Moreover, as Professor Schachter has noted, even 
though Western states were “more ambivalent [about voluntarism] . . . 
 
100.  See O.A. ELIAS & C.L. LIM, THE PARADOX OF CONSENSUALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-98 
(1998) (quoting, for example, the Romanian delegate as stating that “[e]ach State reserves 
to itself the right to recognize or not to recognize the whole or part of international 
custom”). 
101.  See, e.g., 1 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND 
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 5 (1922) (“On principle, therefore, changes in the law of 
nations require the consent of the States affected thereby.”); VILLIGER, supra note 27, at 41-
42. 
102.  See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Sometimes a Great Notion, 27 WILSON Q. 45, 46 (2003) (“It’s 
sometimes claimed that this right of rejection exists only when a rule is first proposed, while 
it is in an inchoate state. But the whole logic of voluntarism undercuts this contention           
. . . .”); Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 299 
(2006) (“A strictly voluntarist view of international law rejects the notion that a state may 
be bound by an international legal rule without its consent and thus does not recognize a 
collective interest that is capable of overriding the will of an individual member of the 
society.”); Brigitte Stern, Custom at the Heart of International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 89, 98 (2001) (“Within the framework of a strict voluntarism, it is unreasonable to claim 
that once custom has been formed it must govern all the states that are part of the 
international community, independently of their will.”). 
103.  See, e.g., JERZY MAKARCZYK, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 
21ST CENTURY 124 (1996) (“Voluntarism was still the leading teaching in the period between 
the two world wars.”). 
104.  See, e.g., G.I. Tunkin, Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International 
Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 419, 427-28 (1961). In fact, it appears that post-Soviet scholars in 
Russia continued to adhere to the voluntarist view. See TARJA LÅNGSTRÖM, 
TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (2003). 
105.  See SCHACHTER, supra note 42, at 10. 
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virtually all of them have asserted at some time or other that they were not 
bound by international rules which they had not accepted.”106 
Regardless of the precise timing, it is clear that at least the initial stages of a 
shift in the literature had begun to occur by the early twentieth century. We 
have found two suggestions about why this happened, one of which we think 
is implausible, and the other of which we think is plausible but normatively 
unattractive. 
Professor Dodge describes the shift as occurring at the same time as the 
shift from natural law to positivism.107 He does not necessarily suggest a causal 
relationship between the two developments, however, and it seems unlikely 
that there was one. The argument for attributing such a relationship might run 
something like this: international norms that would have been treated as 
mandatory as the result of natural law now had to be encompassed within a 
general consent-based theory of CIL. The notion of consent was therefore 
adjusted such that it could be based on the consent of the community of 
nations rather than on the consent of individual nations. An individual right of 
opt-out, however, was inconsistent with this community-based conception of 
consent.108 
We think that this account is implausible for several reasons. First, the 
jurisprudential shift away from natural law and toward positivism had been 
occurring throughout the nineteenth century—and, indeed, had started well 
before that century109—so it would not explain why the Mandatory View 
developed as late as it did. On the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, Chief 
Justice Marshall famously articulated a positivist view of international law as 
early as 1825, in a decision involving the legality of the slave trade.110 Marshall, 
 
106.  Id. 
107.  See Dodge, supra note 54, at 551-52. 
108.  For suggestions somewhat along these lines, see A.V. Lowe, Do General Rules of International 
Law Exist?, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 207, 212 (1983); Raphael M. Walden, The Subjective Element 
in the Formation of Customary International Law, 12 ISR. L. REV. 344, 348 (1977). 
109.  See, e.g., MALANCZUK, supra note 34, at 16; Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: 
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 11 
(1999); Edwin D. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 239, 250-53 (1932); see also LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS, at xxiv (5th ed. 2009) (noting support for positivism among international 
law publicists in the eighteenth century). 
110.  See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 121 (1825) (“Whatever might be the answer of a 
moralist to this question, a jurist must search for its legal solution, in those principles of 
action which are sanctioned by the usages, the national acts, and the general assent, of that 
portion of the world of which he considers himself as a part, and to whose law the appeal is 
made.”). 
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it will be recalled, also endorsed the Default View of CIL in decisions such as 
Schooner Exchange.111 Second, even if the shift toward positivism and the 
adoption of the Mandatory View had happened at the same time, it is not 
obvious why there would be a causal relationship between the two. If anything, 
one would expect that a shift to positivism, which seeks to ground law 
(including international law) in a sovereign source,112 would result in a less 
binding conception of CIL, given that the international community lacks a 
central sovereign (and this was even more so at the end of the nineteenth 
century than it is today). In addition, even if treatise writers were attempting to 
replicate the effect of natural law in a positivist framework, this does not 
explain why they would view all of CIL as now subject to the Mandatory View, 
something that was not true even when natural law was in favor. Instead, they 
could have done what Vattel did, distinguishing between certain norms for 
which there was presumed consent and other norms for which actual consent 
was required. 
Professor Kelly suggests an alternative account. He contends that Western 
states (and their treatise writers) were concerned about the infusion of new and 
non-Western states into the international system and wanted to ensure that 
these states could not opt out of the rules developed by the Western states.113 
This account seems more plausible than the positivism theory. Oppenheim’s 
treatise, for example, specifically links the “family of nations” idea underlying 
the Mandatory View to the issue of new states.114 Moreover, there is evidence 
that American and British support for restricting opt-out rights under CIL was 
tied to a concern about new states.115 This account also plausibly links up with 
the later rise of the persistent objector doctrine, as we explain below. 
Under this account, the Mandatory View was used by Western powers to 
impose their standards on weaker, “uncivilized” countries. In this light, the 
Mandatory View was part of a larger pattern in which treaty “capitulations” 
and other forms of international law were used as another form of 
 
111.  See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137, 147 (1812). 
112.  See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
44 (2005). 
113.  See Kelly, supra note 14, at 510-11. 
114.  See OPPENHEIM, supra note 98, § 12, at 17; see also WESTLAKE, supra note 97, at 82 (“No new 
state, arising from the dismemberment of an old one within the geographical limits of our 
international society, has the option of giving or refusing its consent to the international law 
of that society.”). 
115.  See J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-14 (1947). 
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colonialism.116 Furthermore, it is easy to imagine that Western publicists 
would not have taken seriously the possibility that the uncivilized states should 
be allowed to withdraw from the law created by their civilized brethren. This 
account, however—whereby “universal norms were imposed on non-Western 
societies under the guise of a minimum standard of civilization while imperial 
expansion into Africa and Asia continued”117—does not provide a normative 
justification for adhering to the Mandatory View, especially in a postcolonial 
world made up of nearly two hundred heterogeneous nations. In fact, it 
provides a basis for questioning the normative underpinnings of the 
Mandatory View.118 
Whatever the explanation for the shift, there are reasons to believe that it 
may have occurred more in academic commentary than in state practice. 
Consider the issue that appears to have been a central driving force behind the 
Mandatory View: the desire to bind new states to rules worked out by the 
Western states. Under the Mandatory View, new states allegedly come into the 
system bound by all existing CIL rules and lack any right of unilateral opt-out. 
In fact, this issue was never genuinely settled. As one commentator explains: 
  In the late 1950s and early 1960s, dozens of new states gained their 
independence and challenged customary international law. Many of 
these states refused to consider themselves bound by a law in whose 
formation they had not participated and which, they maintained, did 
not reflect their own cultural and legal traditions.119 
 
116.  See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF 
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 17 (2009); David P. Fidler, The Return of the Standard of 
Civilization, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 137 (2001). 
117.  Kelly, supra note 14, at 510 n.254; see also ANGHIE, supra note 112, at 62 (“All non-European 
societies, regardless of whether they were regarded as completely primitive or relatively 
advanced, were outside the sphere of law, and European society provided the model which 
all societies had to follow if they were to progress.”). 
118.  For discussion of how the “Family of Nations” concept underlying the Mandatory Veiw was 
invoked by commentators like Westlake and Oppenheim to justify subjugation of 
indigenous peoples, see S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-29 
(2d ed. 2004). For discussion of how the Mandatory View was used to buttress arguments 
that disfavored the newly independent states during debates in the 1960s and 1970s over 
whether the new states were required to assume the debts and treaty obligations of their 
colonial masters, see JAMES THUO GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 158-
59 (2010). 
119.  Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the 
International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 474, 478 (1991). 
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Ultimately, the issue of the international responsibilities of new states was not 
resolved as a matter of CIL but was instead addressed on an ad hoc basis and 
through the conclusion of treaties (such as bilateral investment treaties).120 
Moreover, if the Mandatory View had become fully accepted in practice, it 
seems difficult to explain some of the changes that took place in international 
law during the twentieth century. Consider, for example, the shift in sovereign 
immunity that occurred in this time period. Prior to the twentieth century, 
most nations adhered to the “absolute” theory of sovereign immunity, 
pursuant to which they would give foreign nations sued in their courts 
immunity from essentially any cause of action. Starting in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, nations started shifting to the “restrictive” theory 
of immunity, pursuant to which they would give immunity to foreign states 
sued in their courts only for public, sovereign acts, not private, commercial 
acts.121 The United States was a latecomer to this shift, not formally adopting 
the restrictive theory until the Tate Letter in 1952.122 During the period of the 
shift, nations were not generally alleged to be violating international law. 
Rather, they were viewed as simply staking out a new position on immunity 
that was contrary to the default position. In particular, countries that had 
citizens engaged in commercial transactions with foreign nations felt the need 
to limit sovereign immunity. After a while, the default itself shifted. 
Finally, it should be noted that commentators who advocated the 
Mandatory View often had a different conception of how CIL would operate 
from the one that is common today. In particular, these commentators 
understood CIL as arising out of a consensus of a small number of “civilized” 
states and as presumptively binding these states only in their relations with 
each other.123 In addition, some of these commentators thought that new rules 
 
120.  See, e.g., GATHII, supra note 118, at 158-68; Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that 
Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 
651-58 (1998); cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-30 (1964) 
(declining to apply the CIL prohibition on expropriation of alien property because it was too 
controversial). Capital-exporting nations such as the United States insisted, unsurprisingly, 
that the property rights regime was mandatory. See, e.g., 3 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 656 (1942) (quoting diplomatic note from the United States 
to Mexico). 
121.  See GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 115-28 
(1984). 
122.  See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689-90 (2004); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of 
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1983). 
123.  See, e.g., HALL, supra note 66, at 42-43; see also Oscar Schachter, New Custom: Power, Opinio 
Juris and Contemporary Practice, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF 
THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KRZYSTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 531, 536 (Jerzy 
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of CIL could not even develop unless all of the relevant states agreed to the 
change.124 In effect, these ideas meant that each of the “civilized” states would 
have a veto over CIL’s formation. Such a conception of CIL might have made 
sense when the international community was small and comprised of states 
that had frequent and repeated dealings with each other, in addition to 
significant religious and ethnic commonalities. As discussed in the next section, 
however, as the international community of states expanded, both the 
civilized-states idea and the idea of a veto right for every state became 
problematic. Commentators addressed this difficulty, it appears, by 
formulating the persistent objector doctrine, pursuant to which CIL could be 
created even over the objection of a dissenting state. For present purposes, the 
most important point is that the shift in the commentary toward the 
Mandatory View occurred against the backdrop of an understanding of CIL 
formation that is different from the one that prevails today. 
B. Persistent Objector Doctrine 
In this Section, we attempt to move closer to the intellectual origins of the 
Mandatory View of CIL by approaching it from the other direction. In 
particular, we consider here the roots of the persistent objector doctrine, which 
is the one exception to the Mandatory View’s disallowance of unilateral opt-
out. According to this doctrine, nations may avoid becoming bound by a CIL 
rule by persistently objecting to the rule prior to the time when it becomes 
established.125 The doctrine is controversial, although the weight of modern 
academic commentary appears to support it.126 
As we explain, commentary on the doctrine did not begin until the 1950s, 
after a pair of ambiguous ICJ decisions. The doctrine did not become a 
 
Makarczyk ed., 1996) (“As a historical fact, the great body of customary international law 
was made by remarkably few States. Only the States with navies—perhaps 3 or 4 made most 
of the law of the sea.”). 
124.  See, e.g., CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (1924) (“By strict definition, 
international law should embrace only such rules of conduct as are recognized by all the 
members of the international community.” (emphasis added)); see also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. 
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 43-44 (Sept. 7) (Weiss, J., dissenting) (“In reality the 
only source of international law is the consensus omnium. Whenever it appears that all nations 
constituting the international community are in agreement as regards the acceptance for the 
application in their mutual relations of a specific rule of conduct, this rule becomes part of 
international law . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
125.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
126.  See INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 5, at 27 (“Although some authors question the existence of 
this rule, most accept it as part of current international law.”). 
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canonical part of CIL doctrine until sometime later, perhaps not until the 1970s 
or 1980s. Initially, the doctrine was defended in the commentary as a way to 
allow CIL to develop even when some states objected to it. The assumption 
appears to have been that, without the persistent objector doctrine, it might 
not have been possible for a new rule of CIL to arise in the face of objection by 
one or a few states. Some commentators, however, defended the persistent 
objector doctrine as stemming from a requirement of state consent in 
international law, and critics of the doctrine have similarly described it in those 
terms, while challenging the purported consent requirement. 
Although this history of the persistent objector doctrine does not fully 
explain the shift to the Mandatory View, it shows that there was uncertainty in 
the mid-twentieth century over how, precisely, the Mandatory View was 
supposed to work. Moreover, this history may suggest a reason why the 
Mandatory View has generated little academic debate. In particular, it appears 
that commentary on the persistent objector doctrine evolved in such a way as 
to create a narrow choice between the Mandatory View with the persistent 
objector doctrine and the Mandatory View without the persistent objector 
doctrine, thereby obscuring a potential role for the Default View of CIL. 
1. Asylum and Fisheries Cases 
Two decisions from the ICJ in the early 1950s are typically cited as being 
the source of the persistent objector doctrine.127 The Asylum Case involved a 
dispute between Colombia and Peru over Colombia’s decision to grant 
diplomatic asylum to a Peruvian citizen who had been charged by Peru with 
the crime of “military rebellion.”128 At issue was whether Colombia had the 
right to bind Peru to its determination that the offense in question qualified for 
asylum.129 The ICJ held that Colombia had not established the existence of 
such a right under CIL.130 In the alternative, the court briefly stated that, even 
if such a right existed as a matter of custom in Latin America, it could not have 
been invoked against Peru because, by not signing certain conventions that 
ostensibly supported such a right, Peru had opted out of it.131 
 
127.  See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 180-81 (1999); INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra 
note 5, at 27 n.69; WOLFKE, supra note 28, at 66 n.63. 
128.  Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 273 (Nov. 20). 
129.  Id. at 273-74. 
130.  Id. at 274-76. 
131.  Id. at 277-78. 
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As others have noted, the Asylum Case provides little support for the 
persistent objector doctrine. Most of the court’s analysis is dedicated to 
showing that the alleged CIL right does not exist. The court’s brief analysis of 
Peru’s objection to the alleged right concerns a regional custom rather than a 
general norm of CIL.132 Moreover, this analysis does not seem to require that 
Peru have engaged in anything like persistent objection or even that its tacit 
objection have occurred prior to the formation of the CIL rule. Indeed, the 
ICJ’s analysis of this issue could easily be viewed as articulating the Default 
View of CIL. 
The Fisheries Case, decided a year later, pitted the United Kingdom against 
Norway. At issue was whether Norway had used a legally acceptable method in 
drawing the baseline from which it measured its territorial sea.133 The United 
Kingdom argued that CIL did not allow the length of a baseline drawn across a 
bay to be longer than ten miles.134 Again, as with the Asylum Case, the primary 
holding of the case was that the alleged CIL rule did not exist.135 In the 
alternative, the court briefly remarked that, had the rule existed, it would not 
have applied against Norway because Norway had “always opposed any 
attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast.”136 This language is often cited in 
support of the persistent objector doctrine, but it could just as easily be read to 
support the Default View of CIL; there is nothing in this language that 
suggests that Norway’s opposition must have occurred prior to the 
establishment of the alleged rule of CIL. The arguments of the parties do not 
resolve this uncertainty: although the United Kingdom appears to have 
supported something like the modern persistent objector doctrine, at least for 
rights historically exercised by a state (while asserting that Norway had not 
met its requirements),137 Norway (which prevailed in the case) appears to have 
supported something closer to the Default View.138 
 
132.  See D’AMATO, supra note 52, at 252-53. 
133.  Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 125 (Dec. 18). 
134.  Id. at 131. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. 
137.  The United Kingdom argued that Norway was required to show that other nations had 
acquiesced in Norway’s historic claim. See Reply Submitted by the Government of the 
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1950 I.C.J. Pleadings 
291, 303 (Nov. 28, 1950). 
138.  See ELIAS & LIM, supra note 100, at 61-62 (describing the different positions of the United 
Kingdom and Norway and noting that it is unclear to which dissent doctrine the court was 
referring). 
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2. Academic Commentary 
In commenting on the Fisheries decision in 1953, Gerald Fitzmaurice, Legal 
Advisor to the British Foreign Office, stated that the decision supported a right 
to opt out of a CIL rule “before it has crystallized into a definite and generally 
accepted rule of law” but that it did not support a right to opt out after a CIL rule 
becomes established.139 His conclusions were based on a parsing of the decision 
rather than on theoretical considerations.140 
A more theoretical explanation for the persistent objector doctrine appeared 
about nine years later, in Humphrey Waldock’s General Course on Public 
International Law, published in 1962.141 In discussing the Asylum and Fisheries 
decisions, Waldock, a prominent Oxford professor, stated that these decisions 
“seem clearly to indicate that a customary rule may arise notwithstanding the 
opposition of one State, or even perhaps a few States, provided that otherwise 
the necessary degree of generality is reached.”142 As a tradeoff, however, the 
“rule so created will not bind the objectors.”143  Importantly, Waldock was not 
developing these points to argue that CIL, or the persistent objector doctrine, 
was grounded in state consent. Instead, he was pushing against a consent-
based approach to CIL. Thus, he argued that 
in order to invoke a custom against a State it is not necessary to show 
specifically the acceptance of the custom as law by that State; its 
acceptance of the custom will be presumed so that it will be bound 
unless it can adduce evidence of its actual opposition to the practice in 
question.144 
Four years later, however, a British lawyer, Ian Brownlie, published the 
first edition of what would become perhaps the most famous modern treatise 
on international law.145 In that treatise, Brownlie appears to have coined the 
 
139.  Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: 
General Principles and Sources of Law, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 26 (1953). 
140.  Id. For a suggestion that modern academic acceptance of the persistent objector doctrine can 
be traced to Fitzmaurice’s article, see Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 127 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006). 
141.  See Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 RECUEIL DES COURS 
1 (1963). 
142.  Id. at 50. 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. 
145.  See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1st ed. 1966). 
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term “persistent objector” to refer to the ability of a dissenting state to opt out 
of an emerging CIL rule.146 Without elaboration, Brownlie stated that the 
allowance of an opt-out based on persistent objection “is explained by the fact 
that ultimately custom depends on the consent of states.”147 Unlike Waldock, 
therefore, Brownlie tied the persistent objector doctrine to a consent-based 
conception of CIL. 
Other commentators similarly have suggested that the doctrine stems from 
a requirement of consent. The French theorist Prosper Weil, for example, 
observed in a famous article that the persistent objector doctrine (in support of 
which he cited the Asylum and Fisheries decisions) is the “acid test of custom’s 
voluntarist nature.”148 Similarly, Hersch Lauterpacht, a leading international 
lawyer in Britain and a judge on the International Court of Justice, tied the 
persistent objector doctrine to a consent-based theory of international law. In a 
collection of his papers published in 1970 (ten years after his death), 
Lauterpacht contended that the requirement of state consent for CIL was “a 
requirement of substance inasmuch that, although it is not necessary to prove 
the consent of every State, express dissent in the formative stage of a customary 
rule will negative the existence of custom at least in relation to the dissenting 
State.”149 
About a decade after the publication of Brownlie’s treatise, Michael 
Akehurst, another British theorist, set forth a more elaborate defense of the 
persistent objector doctrine in a general article on CIL.150 Akehurst argued that 
the Fisheries decision supported a right to opt out of an emerging CIL rule, and 
he disputed narrower readings of the decision by other commentators.151 He 
also argued that an ability to opt out was needed to avoid theoretical problems 
raised by CIL: 
If the dissent of a single State could prevent the creation of a new rule, 
new rules would hardly ever be created. If a dissenting State could be 
 
146.  See id. at 8; Olufemi Elias, Some Remarks on the Persistent Objector Rule in Customary 
International Law, 6 DENNING L.J. 37, 37 (1991) (“Since the publication of the first edition of 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law in 1966, the term ‘persistent objector’ has 
become a term of art in international law.”). 
147.  BROWNLIE, supra note 145, at 8. 
148.  Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 434 
(1983). 
149.  1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS 66 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 
1970). 
150.  See Akehurst, supra note 36. 
151.  Id. at 24-25. 
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bound against its will, customary law would in effect be created by a 
system of majority voting; but it would be impossible to reach 
agreement about the size of the majority required, and whether (and, if 
so, how) the ‘votes’ of different States should be weighted.152  
Like Waldock, Akehurst described the persistent objector doctrine as part of a 
system whereby “dissent by some States does not prevent the creation of new 
customary rules by other States; it is merely that the dissenting States are not 
bound by the new rules.”153 
Under Waldock’s and Akehurst’s view, the persistent objector doctrine was 
a device to make it easier for CIL rules to become established. Critics of the 
persistent objector doctrine, however, have suggested that the adoption of this 
doctrine involves a return to an outdated consent-based conception of 
international law. The most prominent example of such criticism is an article 
by Jonathan Charney, an American law professor, published in 1985.154 
Charney expressed the view that “[i]t is difficult to see how the acceptance of 
this [persistent objector] rule does not reflect an acceptance of the consent 
theory of international law.”155 Not only is such a theory against the weight of 
modern commentary, he contended, but it is incoherent, because it “does not 
explain why silent dissenters and dissenters who make their objections known 
after the rule has become international law are bound.”156 In other words, 
Charney’s argument was that the persistent objector doctrine did not make 
theoretical sense if one assumes the Mandatory View of CIL. He did not 
entertain the possibility that the Mandatory View itself might be suspect. 
Despite objections like these, the persistent objector doctrine is now part of 
the canonical understanding of CIL. It is unclear precisely when this occurred, 
but it might not have been until the 1970s or 1980s. The Restatement (Second) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, published in 1965, does not 
mention the doctrine. It is mentioned, however, in the Restatement (Third), 
published in 1987,157 and it was mentioned in the first draft of that Restatement, 
 
152.  Id. at 26. 
153.  Id. at 26-27. 
154.  See Charney, supra note 35. 
155.  Id. at 16. 
156.  Id.; see also Guzman, supra note 29, at 166 (“[C]onsent theories cannot explain why the 
persistent objector doctrine puts such a significant burden on the objector not only to 
demonstrate its lack of consent, but to do so repeatedly and during the emergence of the 
rule.”). 
157.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 
cmt. d (1987). 
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circulated in 1980.158 The doctrine did not appear in the Eighth Edition of the 
Oppenheim treatise on international law, published in 1955, but it does appear 
in the Ninth Edition, published in 1992.159 The Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, in a 1987 decision concerning the execution of juvenile 
offenders in the United States, accepted the existence of the persistent objector 
doctrine with respect to ordinary CIL, but reasoned that the doctrine does not 
apply to jus cogens norms.160 A committee of the International Law Association 
endorsed the doctrine in 2000, noting that “most [authors] accept it as part of 
current international law,” and that “[t]here is a measure of judicial and 
arbitral support for the existence of the rule, and no decisions which challenge 
it.”161 
3. Implications for the Mandatory View 
We agree with critics of the persistent objector doctrine that, when viewed 
in isolation, the doctrine is a modern creation with little support outside of 
academic commentary. The Asylum and Fisheries decisions provide no more 
than passing and ambiguous support for the doctrine. State practice since those 
decisions is also relatively unhelpful, since there have been essentially no 
instances in which states have invoked the doctrine. As Professor Stein 
reported in a 1985 article, his research had “failed to turn up any case where an 
author provided even one instance of a state claiming or granting an exemption 
from a rule on the basis of the persistent objector principle—excepting of 
course the Asylum and Fisheries cases themselves.”162 Although there have been 
 
158.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. 
d (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1980). 
159.  Compare 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 17-19 (8th ed. 1955), with 1 
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 29. 
160.  See Roach v. U.S., Case 9647, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 3/87, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 ¶ 54 (1987).  
161.  INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 5, § 15, at 27. The committee lists Bynkershoek as an “early 
example” of an author allegedly endorsing the persistent objector doctrine, but, on the page 
of Bynkershoek’s treatise cited by the committee, Bynkershoek actually endorses the Default 
View of CIL. He asks, “Can a nation abolish the immunities of ambassadors, which they are 
enjoying in accordance with the common law of the nations?” He then answers: “I think 
that it can if it makes a public announcement in regard to them, because these immunities 
owe such validity as they have not to any law but only to a tacit presumption. One nation 
does not bind another, and not even a consensus of all nations except one binds that one, 
isolated though it be, if it is independent and has decreed to use other laws.” BYNKERSHOEK, 
DE FORO LEGATORUM, supra note 57, at 106. 
162.  Stein, supra note 32, at 459; see also, e.g., Patrick Dumberry, Incoherent and Ineffective: The 
Concept of the Persistent Objector Revisited, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 779, 784-93 (2010). 
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predictions in the literature that states would begin to invoke the doctrine more 
frequently (in response, for example, to the increased efforts by U.N. organs to 
influence the development of CIL),163 this prediction has not come to pass. 
We part company with the critics, however, over the implications of this 
conclusion. When viewed in context, the rise of the persistent objector doctrine 
in the academic literature reveals that there were substantial uncertainties in 
the mid-twentieth century over how the Mandatory View was supposed to 
work in a world with an ever-growing number of states. Some defenders of the 
doctrine thought that, under the Mandatory View, new CIL rules might be 
permitted to arise only if essentially every affected state acquiesced in the new 
CIL rule. The persistent objector doctrine was thus an effort to facilitate the 
development of CIL, not an effort to make CIL more consensual. In that light, 
the rise of the persistent objector doctrine did not represent a shift back toward 
a greater consent requirement in international law, as critics suggest. Indeed, it 
may have been part of an effort to make international law less consensual. 
Again, the key point is that the development by commentators of the persistent 
objector doctrine, as with the development of the Mandatory View more 
generally, occurred against a backdrop of uncertainty and debate about how 
CIL operates. 
The fact that the debate over the persistent objector doctrine has been 
framed the way it has, as a choice between a Mandatory View with the doctrine 
and a Mandatory View without the doctrine, may also help explain why there 
has not been more academic scrutiny of the Mandatory View itself. This choice 
has little practical consequence, because the standards for the persistent 
objector doctrine are difficult to meet, and almost no state has ever invoked it, 
let alone done so successfully. Framing the choice in this way is also heavily 
loaded, since commentators who think that state consent is important are 
unlikely to rally around either of the choices. Perhaps most importantly, when 
the choice is framed in this way, it obscures a potential role for the Default 
View of CIL. 
Finally, the almost complete lack of state invocation of the persistent 
objector doctrine provides an additional reason to question the extent to which 
the Mandatory View reflects actual state practice, as opposed to the position of 
commentators. In the treaty context, the best analogy to the persistent objector 
doctrine is the ability of nations to attach reservations to their ratification of 
treaties, thereby opting out of particular rules prior to becoming bound by the 
 
163.  See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 11; Stein, supra note 32, at 466. 
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remainder of the treaty.164 Importantly, the ability to opt out in this manner is 
not simply hypothetical but is instead a common phenomenon in treaty 
practice.165 This is true even though, unlike for CIL under the Mandatory 
View, many treaties also allow for subsequent unilateral withdrawal. If the 
Mandatory View is correct, therefore, it is puzzling that the persistent objector 
doctrine is not reflected in state practice. 
 
* * * 
 
We have shown that the Mandatory View was not always canonical, that its 
adoption in the early twentieth century may have stemmed from questionable 
normative premises relating to the distinction between “civilized” and 
“uncivilized” states, and that even after it became conventional wisdom there 
continued to be significant uncertainties about how it would operate in 
practice. These findings suggest that historical pedigree alone may not be 
sufficient to justify the Mandatory View. In the remainder of the Article we 
consider whether this View can nevertheless be justified on functional terms 
from the perspective of the modern international system. 
iv.  functional assessment of the mandatory view 
We now begin to consider the functional desirability of the Mandatory 
View. According to that view, nations that do not persistently object to CIL 
rules prior to their formation are disallowed from unilaterally opting out of 
them. We begin in this Part by describing some reasons why such a restriction 
on opt-out seems questionable from an institutional-design perspective. These 
reasons include the vague process of CIL formation, the possibility that CIL 
rules will be unduly sticky and that nations will opportunistically create 
holdout problems, and the limited ability of the Mandatory View to respond to 
changing conditions. In the next Part, we consider possible justifications for 
restricting the ability of nations to opt out of CIL rules. Because there is little 
theoretical defense of the Mandatory View in the literature, we are compelled 
to speculate about some of these justifications. Ultimately, we conclude that, 
while there may be good arguments for restricting opt-out in select areas of 
 
164.  See generally AUST, supra note 3, ch. 8 (describing the international law governing the 
attachment of reservations); Richard W. Edwards, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 10 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 362 (1989) (same). 
165.  See, e.g., AUST, supra note 3, at 133-34 (noting that many states attach reservations).  
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CIL, it is difficult to justify the Mandatory View as a general account of how 
CIL should operate. 
A threshold objection to our inquiry might be that the current system—that 
is, the Mandatory View of CIL—must work well, or else it would have been 
changed. There are at least four answers to this objection. First, as discussed in 
Part I, the modern regime of CIL has increasingly been criticized—for example, 
as being incoherent, undemocratic, or ineffectual—prompting some 
commentators to attempt to “save” CIL or “reconcile” its tensions.166 There are 
signs, in other words, that the system may not be working well. Second, as we 
hope to have shown, there is evidence that the current system may not have 
persisted for as long as many assume and that its foundations may be rooted in 
normatively unattractive propositions. Third, there is no particular reason to 
conclude that the state of the law at a given time is always optimal. This 
assumption is particularly problematic with respect to international law, since, 
as we explain below, it lacks some of the mechanisms common in a domestic 
legal system for addressing inefficiencies. Finally, even if one assumes that the 
very existence of the current system constitutes evidence of its optimality, there 
remains the intellectual puzzle of why a restricted exit system would be 
optimal. Unearthing the answer to that puzzle is, for us, a sufficient reason for 
this inquiry. 
A. Process of CIL Formation 
There are a variety of reasons to think that the Mandatory View does not 
reflect an optimal design. The first reason concerns the process by which CIL is 
formed. As scholarship on voting rules and constitutional design makes clear, 
in the structure of any regulatory scheme, the processes governing rule creation 
should be related to those governing alteration.167 In particular, stringent 
alteration rules are normally adopted only when the process for rule formation 
is relatively clear, stringent, and involves a high degree of deliberation. This is 
often true with national constitutions where, in order to ensure institutional 
stability and to protect minority rights from encroachment, certain rights are 
made difficult to alter absent a high degree of consensus. In those situations, 
precisely because alteration in the future is difficult, participants often insist on 
 
166.  See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 29; Roberts, supra note 13. 
167.  See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System, 37 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 193, 225-26 (2003) (noting the symmetry between difficult formation rules and 
difficult exit rules for not only domestic constitutions, but also treaties); John O. McGinnis 
& Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 
VA. L. REV. 385, 426 (2003) [hereinafter Symmetric Entrenchment]. 
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a rule-formation process that instills confidence—something that can involve 
requiring a high degree of transparency, public participation, and detached 
decisionmaking.168 When the rules in question bind not just the current 
generation of voters but also future generations, the need for careful, detailed, 
and difficult processes of rule formation that will generate high-quality rules 
becomes even more important.169 
As discussed in Part I, the formation rules for CIL are notoriously unclear. 
No one knows precisely how much state practice is required to create a CIL 
rule, what form that practice must take, or how long it must last.170 The 
standards for identifying the requisite opinio juris for CIL are even less clear.171 
As noted in a popular international law treatise, “Customary international law 
is ordinarily found by a more or less subjective weighing of the evidence, and 
subjective scales tilt differently in different hands.”172 Moreover, the 
mechanisms for creating CIL have become broader and more relaxed in the 
modern era, with less emphasis on state practice, and CIL rules can form much 
more quickly than in the past (even instantly, some argue).173 
The Mandatory View is therefore contrary to the observation in the voting 
rules and constitutional design literatures, which is that difficult alteration 
rules should be reserved for situations in which the formation rules are 
relatively clear and stringent. With CIL, we have relatively vague and easy 
formation rules matching up to a high difficulty of alteration—an asymmetry 
that seems to have increased over time. On the flip side, some of the rules 
created under the new process of CIL formation, such as in the human rights 
area, are considered to be even more binding than those created via the old 
processes (especially if they have the status of jus cogens norms), further 
increasing the asymmetry between formation and alteration rules in CIL. To be 
sure, this observation accepts as a given modern accounts of how CIL can arise 
more quickly and can be influenced by multilateral treaties and 
 
168.  Cf. Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 
383-84 (1995) (discussing the need for detached deliberation in constitution-making); Tom 
Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 707, 710, 722-23 (2006) (discussing the lock-in characteristic that is found 
in most national constitutions). 
169.  On the relationship between formation processes, rule quality, and exit rules, see John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703 
(2002); Symmetric Entrenchment, supra note 167, at 425. 
170.  See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
171.  See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
172.  MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (5th ed. 2008). 
173.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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pronouncements and decisions of international institutions; it is less applicable 
if one rejects these modern claims. 
Even if rooted in genuine state practice, the process of CIL formation raises 
questions about the quality of the rules that are produced. If rules are going to 
be difficult to exit from, participants will rationally want to ensure that they are 
of a high quality.174 The literature on social norms makes clear that customary 
rules are most likely to be of high quality when developed in a small, 
homogenous group, with frequent opportunities for interaction among 
members of the interpretive community.175 Unlike the era in which courts 
talked about CIL rules as existing among a handful of “civilized” states, today 
CIL is said to arise from the practices of, and become binding on, all 192 
nations of the world. These 192 nations have wide variations in ethnicity, 
culture, politics, resources, and economics. Further, these nations often only 
have limited interaction with each other on particular issues and are unlikely to 
have adequate incentives to police and punish rule violations by each other.176 
These conditions make it less likely that the aggregation of state practice, 
which is the basis for traditional CIL formation, will generate efficient rules.177 
We might have more confidence that CIL rules would develop in an 
efficient manner in a system that operated against the backdrop of regular 
adjudication. One argument for the efficiency of the common law, for example, 
is that inefficient rules are more likely to be litigated because they impose 
greater costs on the parties.178 Courts, the argument goes, will learn from each 
other and evolve toward rules that reduce the number of disputes. The 
problem for CIL is that, unlike in the common law litigation model, the 
number of disputes that are heard by international tribunals is small, and most 
international disputes are instead addressed through diplomatic channels.179 
 
174.  Symmetric Entrenchment, supra note 167, at 425. 
175.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
177-82 (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations 
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 116, 141-43 (1992); Barak D. Richman, How 
Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383, 408-09 (2006). 
176.  See John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. 
L. REV. 1175, 1222 (2007). 
177.  Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859, 
889-94 (2006). 
178.  See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 65, 67 (1977). 
179.  See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 176, at 1223 (“[I]nternational law is tested in the crucible 
of litigation too rarely to make that theory of common law efficiency plausible in the 
international context.”). 
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That means that judges deciding international law matters have neither the 
opportunity to evaluate the analysis of the same issue by a variety of tribunals 
nor the incentive to reduce the numbers of disputes by shaping efficient 
rules.180 
B. Stickiness Concerns 
A second set of concerns raised by the Mandatory View is that inefficient 
rules will be unduly perpetuated, something that is referred to in scholarship 
on contract theory as a “stickiness” problem.181 Although CIL rules may not be 
difficult to form in the first instance, the Mandatory View makes it hard to 
change established rules by constraining nations from withdrawing. 
Presumably, the key assumption underlying this regime is that, unless 
constrained, nations will engage in excessive withdrawal from CIL rules. In 
fact, there are reasons to suspect that, even under a default approach to CIL, 
the system will face the opposite problem: CIL rules will remain in place even 
after they are no longer socially desirable. If so, the Mandatory View would be 
worsening an already present stickiness problem. 
First, consider the assumption that a Default View will lead to excessive 
withdrawals. As discussed earlier, there was a significant period of time during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when commentators believed that 
nations could unilaterally withdraw from at least some rules of CIL.182  We have 
found no indication from these commentaries, however, that this Default View 
led to excessive withdrawals. Nor have we found suggestions that the shift 
from the Default View to the Mandatory View occurred because a spate of 
withdrawals from CIL had undermined the system. 
Second, in the modern era, nations are allegedly able to opt out of CIL rules 
before they form through persistent objection. Nevertheless, nations rarely 
invoke this right. Although there have been predictions that nations would 
begin invoking the persistent objector doctrine more frequently, this prediction 
has not been borne out.183 Professor Byers suggests that part of the reason for 
this is that there are significant nonlegal pressures, such as the reciprocal 
 
180.  Nor, unlike in the area of corporate law in the United States, do we see competition among 
courts over the quality of their CIL interpretations. Cf. id. (discussing competition among 
courts as a factor leading to increased efficiency). 
181.  See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 651 (2006); Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 91-92 
(2005). 
182.  See supra Part II. 
183.  See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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nature of most interstate relationships, that result in even powerful nations 
such as the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom eventually backing 
away from their objections to CIL rules.184 Whatever the reason, the key point 
is that the Mandatory View does not appear to be necessary to deter exit. 
Third, as seen from Professor Helfer’s research, many treaties either have 
explicit withdrawal clauses or implicitly allow for withdrawal.185 
Commentators have evinced few concerns, however, about excessive 
withdrawals from multilateral treaties.186 Nor do we know of any evidence 
suggesting that nations have moved away from including withdrawal clauses in 
treaties due to perceived abuses.187 While it could be argued that the 
Mandatory View of CIL is itself deterring treaty withdrawals, we think this is 
unlikely. Treaties and CIL do not have identical content, and many treaties are 
“progressive” in that they codify principles not contained in CIL.188 Moreover, 
even when treaties and CIL contain substantively similar rules, treaties tend to 
be more specific and are more likely to be connected to enforcement and 
adjudicative mechanisms. As a result, if a nation no longer agreed with the 
provisions in a treaty, it would have an incentive to exercise its right of 
withdrawal even if it could not also exit from substantively similar CIL. 
The foregoing suggests that there is little reason to be concerned that a 
Default View would lead to excessive withdrawal. In fact, it is possible that, 
even under that approach, there might actually be insufficient withdrawal. 
Drawing from scholarship on contract theory, there are reasons to believe that 
nations will adhere to rules well beyond the point at which they have become 
inefficient, even if nations had the ability to withdraw from them. Among the 
theoretical reasons to expect stickiness in the CIL context are what are referred 
to as “network externalities,” “learning externalities,” and “negative signals.” 
Network externalities can arise, for example, when members of a group use a 
 
184.  See BYERS, supra note 127, at 181. 
185.  See Helfer, supra note 1, at 1604-10. 
186.  See id. at 1585, 1602, 1608 (noting that the issue of treaty exit had received little attention 
from commentators even though “denunciations and withdrawals are a regularized 
component of modern treaty practice”). 
187.  Cf. Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter 2008, at 115, 131 (suggesting that modern treaties often include withdrawal 
clauses); Helfer, supra note 1, at 1593 (same); Barbara Koremenos, When, What, and Why 
Do States Choose to Delegate?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2008, at 151, 175-76 (same).  
188.  See Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), art. 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/174(II) (Nov. 1, 1947) (defining “progressive development of international law,” for 
purposes of the functions of the UN’s International Law Commission, as “the preparation of 
draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or in 
regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States”). 
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common product, such as a common contract term.189 If all members of the 
group commit to using the same contract term, there are efficiency gains in 
that the individual parties do not need to spend time negotiating new 
provisions; everyone can assume that everyone else understands what the basic 
contract rules will be. A similar dynamic might operate with, for example, rules 
of diplomatic immunity. If nations can assume that the same rules of 
diplomatic immunity apply, no matter where, then there will be no need to 
negotiate specific rules every time a diplomatic mission is established in a new 
country. This benefit of standardization of rules comes with a cost, however, in 
that individual nations may be slow to shift to new rules even when the old 
rules have become suboptimal for the system. 
Adding to the network effects, there may also be learning externalities, 
which are the benefits that come from using the same rules over a long period 
of time.190 The longer a rule or a contract provision is used, the better 
understood it will be. In the CIL context, the primary actors are government 
bureaucrats. One might expect that the government bureaucrats responsible 
for international relations, once they develop expertise in operating with a 
certain set of rules, will be reluctant to change.191 Network and learning 
externalities will often operate in conjunction with each other to erect barriers 
to change.192 One can imagine, for example, lawyers in the various ministries of 
defense who are specialists in the rules of war under some combination of CIL 
and the Geneva Conventions. Many of the existing rules governing war are 
likely outdated, in that they were designed for different types of armed conflict 
 
189.  See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: 
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 348-49 (1996) 
[hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence]; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, 
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 
VA. L. REV. 713, 715-16 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Economics of Boilerplate]. 
190.  See, e.g., Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 189, at 350-53. 
191.  For a discussion of how the incentives and choices of bureaucrats can drive compliance with 
international law, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 4, 274-82 
(1995).  
192.  See Kahan & Klausner, Economics of Boilerplate, supra note 189, at 725-27; see also Zachary 
Elkins & Beth Simmons, On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework, 598 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 33, 39-41 (2005) (applying network effects to explain 
diffusion in the international context). 
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than the types of conflicts we see today.193 Nevertheless, some combination of 
network and learning externalities probably produces barriers to change.194 
Finally, concerns about sending negative signals may add to stickiness. In 
settings where reputations are important, and the parties have incomplete 
information about each other’s intentions, parties will be concerned about 
sending the wrong signals to their counterparties.195 Altering a standard 
contract term, for example, presents the risk that it will raise the suspicions of 
counterparties that something is amiss. The same dynamic may apply in the 
CIL context. Fearing a negative inference by others, nations may be unwilling 
to deviate from long-established rules of interaction, even when those rules are 
recognized as inefficient.196 
The foregoing theoretical conjectures are supported by empirical evidence 
from the field of sovereign debt contracts. The standard provisions in these 
contracts are distillations of norms of debtor-creditor behavior that have 
evolved over long periods of time (akin to customary norms) and (unlike under 
the Mandatory View for CIL) are also defaults in that nations are free to alter 
them.197 Multiple studies show that states, despite the option to alter 
provisions, adhere to inefficient contract provisions long after these provisions 
are recognized to have become inefficient.198 The evidence further suggests that 
among the reasons for this stickiness are network effects and concerns about 
negative signals.199 A caveat here is that the foregoing evidence draws on the 
 
193.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
194.  For a more general treatment of how inefficient rules or norms can persist in a custom-based 
system, see Francesco Parisi, Spontaneous Emergence of Law: Customary Law, 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
L. & ECON. 603, 612-14 (2000). 
195.  See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 181, at 651-52. 
196.  For a discussion of other factors that might lead to contract stickiness, including 
psychological factors, see Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998). 
197.  See, e.g., J.H. Dalhuisen, Custom and Its Revival in Transnational Private Law, 18 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 339, 363 (2008) (explaining that when contract terms become standard for 
an industry, they may acquire the form of custom). 
198.  See, e.g., Michael Bradley, James D. Cox & Mitu Gulati, The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks 
and Their Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (2010); 
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical 
Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 993 (2004); Karen Halversen Cross, 
Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 335, 374-76 
(2005). 
199.  See Choi & Gulati, supra note 198, at 993 (attributing stickiness in part to network effects); 
Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1627, 1677 (2006) (reporting on market actors describing concerns regarding negative 
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behavior of officials in ministries of finance rather than ministries of foreign 
affairs, and it is the latter who are primarily involved in CIL matters. It is 
unlikely, however, that officials in the ministries of foreign affairs will be less 
concerned about reputation and negative signals than their counterparts in the 
ministries of finance.200 Again, one would expect this stickiness problem to be 
exacerbated by the Mandatory View, which (unlike in the sovereign debt 
context) disallows unilateral opt-out. 
C. Holdout Problems 
Related to the concern about stickiness is the concern that a disallowance of 
unilateral opt-out will cause nations to act opportunistically and demand 
concessions before agreeing to any alterations of CIL (even efficient ones). In 
other contexts, this is referred to as a “holdout” problem.201 As noted, the 
precise fraction or number of nations whose approval needs to be obtained 
before an extant CIL rule can be altered is unclear. That lack of clarity makes it 
difficult to describe the precise nature of the holdout problem under the 
current Mandatory View. To be able to evaluate the potential holdout problem, 
therefore, we have to make a series of assumptions about how the current 
system works. 
We assume that if a nation were to act in a fashion contrary to existing CIL 
and if few other nations objected, a new CIL rule might gradually emerge, but 
that objections from even a minority of nations likely would prevent this from 
happening.202 In voting terms, acquiescence (or nonobjection) is treated in the 
CIL process as the equivalent of a vote of approval for the change. With that 
qualification, however, there is, in effect, a supermajority approval 
 
signals); Mitu Gulati & Robert Scott, Three and a Half Minutes (Nov. 13, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (reporting on the negative signal story). 
200.  If anything, the ministries of finance should be less concerned about sending negative 
signals by exiting an inefficient contract term because their signals are being interpreted by 
sophisticated financial markets rather than the bureaucrats in other countries. 
201.  See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991). 
202.  The literature is not clear on precisely what fraction of states need to explicitly object in 
order to prevent a new rule of CIL from forming. Commentators suggest that a single state, 
by objecting, cannot bar a new rule of CIL from forming. They also suggest that CIL does 
not form simply as a matter of majority rule. Rather, it requires something close to a 
consensus. See, e.g., JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 16-17 (Hersch Lauterpacht & C.H.M. Waldock eds., 1958); ELIAS & LIM, supra note 100, 
at 70-78; Akehurst, supra note 36, at 25-27. Putting together the foregoing suggests that the 
fraction of nations that needs to object to bar the formation of a new CIL rule is significantly 
less than a majority, but greater than a handful. 
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requirement. Such a requirement creates a potential holdout problem because a 
small group of nations can threaten to object vocally to, and thereby derail, 
attempts by other nations to deviate from existing CIL rules. 
In small, homogenous groups, where the interests of members are 
relatively uniform and where the members interact repeatedly, social and 
reputational pressures can serve to alleviate holdout problems.203 That means 
that these small groups can often afford to require a high degree of consensus 
before decisions are made. As groups get larger and more diverse, however, 
internal pressures become more diffuse, asymmetries of information increase, 
and the threat of informal sanctions becomes less potent. Those factors 
increase the risk of holdouts.204 
Applying this analysis to the modern international system, which is large, 
heterogeneous, characterized by significant asymmetries of information, and 
has widely varying threats of sanctions, suggests that the system is vulnerable 
to holdouts. This is particularly so in contexts involving nations that have 
limited interactions with one another. Under such conditions, nations may be 
tempted to collude with others to block alterations to CIL so as to extract 
concessions from the nations seeking change. This could happen even if the 
change at issue would be value-enhancing for the group as a whole. 
Such holdout problems are likely to dampen cooperation in international 
lawmaking. Conversely, if there were a right of withdrawal, a nation that found 
a CIL rule to be problematic could announce its reasons for withdrawal and 
propose a new rule. If there were other nations that also derived benefits from 
the change, and relatively few who suffered costs, this could be an occasion for 
a cooperative move toward a treaty. Along these lines, allowing withdrawal 
could also enhance collaboration in innovation and experimentation in 
lawmaking. Under the Mandatory View, when there are suggestions of a new 
rule, some nations might be concerned that the rules will turn out to have 
 
203.  See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 115 (1962); Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise 
of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1373-74 (1997). The question of 
how factors such as group size, communication, and interaction can affect the group’s ability 
to avoid holdout and free rider problems has also received extensive attention from 
researchers studying group psychology. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes, Alphons J.C. van de 
Kragt & John M. Orbell, Not Me or Thee but We: The Importance of Group Identity in Eliciting 
Cooperation in Dilemma Situations, 68 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 83 (1988). 
204.  See Rory Macmillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-out System, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 57, 
67 (1995) (describing the transition from syndicated loans to bonds and the increased 
difficulties of coordination and risks of holdouts that resulted); Christopher C. Wheeler & 
Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign 
Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253, 260-61 (2003) (same). 
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unforeseen negative consequences. If so, these nations with concerns will work 
hard to prevent new CIL from forming out of a fear that, once it forms, it will 
be binding and hard to change. By contrast, if a right of future withdrawal is 
permitted, it provides nations with a form of insurance, in that they can 
experiment with how the rule works for them and then withdraw if its negative 
effects outweigh the benefits.205 
D. Adaptability to Change 
Another reason to suspect that the Mandatory View is inefficient is the 
continually changing nature of the international system. Restrictions on 
altering governance rules make the most sense when the issues are ones for 
which the answers are likely to remain the same regardless of changes in 
circumstances.206 Given that CIL potentially covers all aspects of interstate 
interaction, there are likely to be many topics for which changes in 
circumstances have altered the nature of interstate interactions. Consider, for 
example, subjects that appear to raise the most difficult collective action 
problems in the modern international context: war, pollution, overfishing, 
disease, and terrorism.207 The nature of every one of those problems has 
changed over the last few decades as a result of advances in technology, 
alterations in state behavior, and other factors. 
National treaty practice shows that nations understand the need in such an 
international system for variety and flexibility in withdrawal rules. As 
discussed in Part I, there is substantial overlap today between the coverage of 
treaties and CIL.208 Yet we know that nations often decide to include 
withdrawal rights in treaties. So, when nations have deliberated over the opt-
out question, they have not chosen a mandatory regime across the board. 
Instead, they have agreed on opt-out rights that vary across different treaty 
 
205.  Professor Helfer makes a similar point in the context of withdrawal rights for treaties. See 
Helfer, supra note 1, at 1591. 
206.  See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, The Condorcet Case for Supermajority 
Rules, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 67, 113 (2008) (arguing that “relatively few norms should be 
entrenched against changing circumstances”); McGinnis & Somin, supra note 176, at 1209 
(making the point in the international law context). 
207.  See ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 3-5 (2009). 
208.  See also, e.g., George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 
99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 544 (2005) (“CIL . . . exists in a wide variety of fields and coexists in 
many areas with treaty law.”). 
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regimes and in terms of notice or other prerequisites for their use.209 Moreover, 
these opt-out rights are not hypothetical. Professor Helfer reports that, in the 
period between 1945 and 2004, there were over fifteen hundred withdrawals 
from multilateral treaties, and probably many more from bilateral treaties.210 
The greater rigidity of the Mandatory View as compared with treaty practice is 
peculiar, given that one of the supposed virtues of having a CIL regime exist 
alongside an extensive treaty regime is that CIL can evolve more easily in 
response to changing conditions.211 
Importantly, in addition to helping to preserve the adaptability of CIL, a 
Default View would help protect the withdrawal rights that nations have 
agreed upon in treaties. Many claims concerning the content of CIL rely heavily 
on treaties.212 The idea is that widespread ratification of a treaty can itself 
constitute the state practice and opinio juris needed to generate CIL, with the 
result that even nations that do not join the treaty may become bound by CIL 
rules that are similar to the terms of the treaty.213 This proposition is not free 
from controversy, but if it is true it threatens to render withdrawal clauses in 
multilateral treaties meaningless. A nation that invoked such a clause could still 
find itself bound to a similar CIL rule, and the Mandatory View would deny 
any right of subsequent opt-out from such a rule.214 Under a Default View, by 
contrast, opt-out rights under CIL could parallel those available under treaties. 
 
209.  For situations in which reliance interests are substantial, such as in bilateral investment 
treaties, nations sometimes require a long notice period as a prerequisite for withdrawal. See 
Helfer, supra note 1, at 1625. 
210.  See id. at 1602. 
211.  See, e.g., NANCY KONTOU, THE TERMINATION AND REVISION OF TREATIES IN THE LIGHT OF 
NEW CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 10, 68-71 (1994); VILLIGER, supra note 27, at 38; 
R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 25, 97 (1971). 
212.  See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
213.  See Weil, supra note 148, at 438-40 (describing and criticizing this idea); see also Hiram E. 
Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory of International Law: The Distinction Between Treaty and 
Customary Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 973, 978 (1995) (“[The] comparative 
disadvantage of treaty, combined with the universal reach of customary law, currently 
motivates a conclusory equivalence of treaty provisions (binding only on treaty-parties) 
with customary, hence universally applicable, rules.”). 
214.  Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26) (controversially relying 
on CIL that was similar to multilateral treaty obligations despite lack of jurisdiction to hear 
the treaty claims). 
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E. Professor Guzman’s Proposal 
One of the few commentators to recognize the potential inefficiency of the 
Mandatory View is Professor Guzman, who considers CIL from the perspective 
of rational choice theory.215 Guzman’s proposed solution, however, seems 
incomplete. 
Guzman has proposed modifying the Mandatory View to go beyond the 
persistent (prior) objector opt-out to allow also a narrow subsequent objector 
exit option. The subsequent objector, under Guzman’s proposal, would have to 
object “from the moment at which it has an interest in the issue.”216 Guzman 
defines an “interest” as occurring when a CIL rule begins to affect a nation “in 
a significant way.”217 
Guzman’s proposal is an improvement over the status quo in that it 
expands the existing opt-out right and corrects for the problem in the current 
scheme whereby nations might find themselves bound by a CIL rule that they 
were not even aware was in the process of crystallizing. It is not clear, however, 
why the subsequent opt-out right should be limited to the first time that a 
nation has an interest in a CIL issue. After all, exogenous shocks might occur to 
significantly alter a nation’s interests over time.218 In theory, so long as there is 
a significant change in interests, Guzman’s own rationale should extend to 
allowing opt-outs at these later points in time as well. Nor is it likely to be clear 
when the effect of a rule becomes “significant” for purposes of Guzman’s 
proposed test. 
Guzman resists giving greater subsequent opt-out rights due to concerns 
about opportunistic withdrawals on the eve of a violation and the need for 
advance notice to other nations.219 As we explain in the next Part, however, 
both concerns can be addressed under the framework of a Default View.220 
Moreover, these concerns potentially apply in the area of treaties, yet 
subsequent withdrawal rights are common in that context. Finally, although an 
improvement over the Mandatory View, Guzman’s approach remains subject 
to some of the same objections as that view. In particular, by making it much 
more difficult to exit from CIL rules than from treaty rules, this approach 
 
215.  See Guzman, supra note 29, at 169-71. 
216.  Id. at 170. 
217.  Id. 
218.  See Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh & Zachary Elkins, Commitment and Diffusion: How 
and Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 224. 
219.  See Guzman, supra note 29, at 168-69. 
220.  See infra Part V. 
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continues to implicate the same concerns about formation quality, stickiness, 
holdouts, and insufficient adjustment to changing circumstances as the 
Mandatory View. 
v. the affirmative case for restricting opt-out 
Having set out reasons for skepticism about the functional desirability of 
the Mandatory View, we now consider some affirmative justifications for 
restricting opt-out from CIL. To gain traction on this question, we again draw 
on theories developed in the areas of contract law, corporate law, voting rules, 
and constitutional design. In each of those areas, scholars have considered the 
question of when severe restrictions on withdrawal or alteration rights should 
be imposed. We conclude from this literature that it is unlikely that the 
Mandatory View makes sense as a matter of institutional design for all of CIL, 
although restricted withdrawal rights might be justified for certain types of 
issues. We begin with the two justifications for the Mandatory View that we 
have found in the literature and then speculate about additional possible 
justifications. 
A. Reliance 
Scholarship on CIL contains almost no theoretical explanation for the 
Mandatory View.221 One explanation that we have found, made without 
elaboration, concerns reliance. Mark Villiger, in his book, Customary 
International Law and Treaties, wrote that a subsequent opt-out right “is 
untenable . . . because other States have come to rely on the ‘subsequent 
objector’ originally conforming to the rule.”222 
This reliance argument is insufficient, at least as an account of why all of 
CIL should be subject to the Mandatory View. To say that nations should not 
be allowed to withdraw from CIL because others are expecting them not to 
withdraw is circular, since the expectation is itself affected by the rules for 
withdrawal. Moreover, as illustrated by the withdrawal rules in the treaty 
context, a notice requirement will at least sometimes be sufficient to address 
reliance interests, and this in fact was the view that a number of leading 
commentators held about CIL during the nineteenth century. 
 
221.  There is no explanation, for example, in the sources cited supra, note 5. 
222.  VILLIGER, supra note 27, at 36; see also Guzman, supra note 29, at 168-69 (while defending a 
restrictive opt-out rule on reliance grounds, also advocating for a narrow subsequent 
objector exception). 
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To be sure, there are situations in which reliance interests might provide an 
argument for restricting withdrawal rights. The contracts literature concerning 
holdup problems tells us that an easy ability to withdraw from a relationship 
can lead to underinvestment.223 Particularly in situations in which parties make 
sequential investments, the party making the first investment will be concerned 
that, once it has made its investment, it will be subject to the risk of holdup by 
the counterparty who can threaten to withhold its investment unless it is given 
something extra. Ex ante, if this risk of holdup is significant, parties will refrain 
from investing—hence, the underinvestment problem.224 
These considerations may be relevant to some CIL issues. Imagine a CIL 
rule that requires all nations to scuttle their biological weapons. If, after all the 
other nations have scuttled their weapons, nation A, which has not yet scuttled 
its weapons, announces that it is withdrawing from the rule and keeping its 
weapons, that will give it a considerable advantage over the other nations. The 
other nations, fearing and expecting such opportunistic behavior in the future, 
will therefore not scuttle their weapons in the first place. The end result will be 
that no weapons are scuttled. As a result, this may be a situation in which 
effective cooperation depends on restricting withdrawal. 
It is not clear to what extent this sort of situation, in which there is reliance 
and a strong incentive to cheat, can effectively be regulated by CIL. In the area 
of weapons control, for example, we find that nations typically turn to treaties 
instead of relying on CIL. These treaties, by providing mechanisms for 
communication, monitoring, and collective sanctions, can attempt to address 
the incentives that nations might have to behave opportunistically in an 
uncoordinated system. 
In any event, the key point is that reliance interests will not be as strong for 
all CIL issues. Consider, for example, a CIL rule that prohibits the screening of 
the pouches used by diplomats for materials brought into host countries. (As 
with many CIL issues, a treaty currently regulates this issue, but put that 
complication aside for the moment.) Imagine that some nations begin abusing 
the diplomatic pouch—using it to smuggle in terrorism-related materials, for 
example. If a host nation announces that it is going to start screening the 
pouches—say, by using x-ray machines—it is not clear that reliance interests 
should bar this withdrawal from the CIL rule. Other nations will be on notice 
of the host country’s change and can adjust their diplomatic relations 
 
223.  See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 686 (2007); Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, Hold-Up 
and Sequential Specific Investments, 35 RAND J. ECON. 386, 386 (2004). 
224.  See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 223, at 686; Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-
Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 551, 559-63. 
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accordingly. In addition, the host country will be exposed to possible reciprocal 
screening of its own diplomatic pouches by other countries and will have had 
to factor in that consequence when deciding whether to withdraw from the CIL 
rule. Moreover, it is not self-evident that a complete lack of screening is the 
socially desirable outcome; if the abuse of pouches is a significant problem, 
limited screening may be worth the cost that it imposes on diplomatic privacy. 
As a further illustration of how the Default View might be beneficial while 
adequately addressing reliance interests, consider the CIL on governmental 
succession to debts. Under this CIL, changes in a government do not eliminate 
a nation’s debt obligations, even if the former government was corrupt and 
oppressive, and even if the debt was incurred for activities and projects that did 
not benefit the people of the nation. There is, in other words, no exception in 
the CIL rule for what are known as “odious debts.”225 A number of 
commentators have concluded that the current CIL rule is inefficient, either 
because it does not adequately deter dictators from seeking to take over the 
government or because it does not provide lenders with a sufficient incentive to 
exert care in determining whether they are assisting a despotic government.226 
Given these potential inefficiencies, one might imagine that it would be in the 
best interest of a nation that was particularly prone to takeovers by dictators to 
be able to exit from the traditional CIL rule and announce that in the future it 
would not be bound by debts determined by some neutral body to be odious. 
Such an announcement might make it more difficult for a subsequent 
dictatorship in that country to borrow money, and that fact might make a 
takeover less attractive to a dictator in the first place.227 Under the Mandatory 
View, however, such a nation would not be allowed to opt out of the strict CIL 
 
225.  The standard definition of “odious debts” comes from a Russian scholar, Alexander Sack, 
who suggested that nations should be allowed to repudiate debts if, with the knowledge of 
the lender, the debts were incurred by a despotic government for a purpose that was not in 
the general interests of the nation. See A.-N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES 
ETATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES 157 (1927). 
Despite some claims to the contrary, the Sackian odious debt doctrine has never become part 
of CIL. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 391, 406 (2005). 
226.  See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious Debts?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Autumn 2007, at 47, 48-51; Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious Regimes?, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2007, at 83, 86-88; Seema Jayachandran & Michael 
Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82, 82-85 (2006). 
227.  See Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 226, at 82-85. In theory, a dictatorship could attempt 
to opt back in to the traditional CIL rule in an effort to borrow money, but in doing so it 
would be implicitly stating that it wanted the flexibility to incur odious debts, something 
that it would likely be reluctant to announce. 
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rule, even though reliance interests presumably could be addressed through 
advance notice to creditors.228 
As noted, the existence of treaties will complicate many CIL examples 
today, since treaties now regulate most of the subjects regulated by CIL. When 
reliance issues are significant, treaties are probably a better way to address 
them, since treaties can specifically address the issue of withdrawal and can 
provide mechanisms to promote stability in the treaty relationship, such as 
mandating arbitration or adjudication and establishing monitoring and 
verification regimes. Importantly, however, even in the treaty context, we find 
that nations often do not prohibit withdrawal. As we have seen for many 
treaties, withdrawal rights are either explicitly negotiated (often with a notice 
requirement) or, if not made explicit, assumed to exist. If nations making 
treaties rarely consider it necessary to bar withdrawal so as to induce the 
necessary amounts of reliance, it seems unlikely that such a bar would be 
necessary for inducing reliance with respect to CIL. 
The following example, based on an accepted modern principle of 
international law, further illustrates that a complete ban on opt-out is not 
always necessary to protect reliance interests. Under modern treaty practice, 
many treaties, especially large multilateral treaties, do not become binding on 
nations until the countries engage in an act of ratification–such as sending an 
instrument of ratification to the United Nations. It is common, however, for a 
national representative to sign a treaty prior to ratification, sometimes many 
years prior. It is generally thought that, during the interim period between 
signature and ratification, a nation is legally bound under CIL not to take any 
actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty until such time as 
the nation makes clear its intent not to become a party to the treaty.229 The idea 
is that nations should not be allowed to sign a treaty and then surreptitiously 
take actions that substantially change the nature of the bargain between the 
parties. Thus, if two nations tentatively sign an agreement to cut their 
armaments by half, and after signing the agreement (but before ratification) 
one of the nations was allowed secretly to double its armaments, it would be 
depriving the other party of the bargain that had been reached. If this sort of 
behavior were allowed, nations would be less willing to make concessions in 
 
228.  If investors know, ex ante, that future governments will not be legally obligated to pay debts 
determined to be odious, they can factor this into the original price. Id. at 83-85. They will 
also have an incentive to monitor the debtor’s expenditures. 
229.  Like many CIL rules today, this rule is reflected in a treaty (the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, see supra note 3). But it is also commonly said to be a rule of CIL and thus 
binding on nonparty countries such as the United States. See Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified 
Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307 (2007). 
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treaty negotiations, and international cooperation would be undermined. On 
the other hand, a nation may have legitimate reasons for deciding not to 
proceed with ratification after signing a treaty, and nations would be less likely 
to sign treaties if such signing was irrevocable. Importantly, these competing 
interests are addressed by allowing opt-out subject to a notice requirement, not 
by disallowing opt-out altogether. 
B. Rule of Law and Legitimacy 
The only other argument for the Mandatory View that we have found in 
the literature, also made without elaboration, concerns the preservation of the 
rule of law. The idea is expressed by Martin Dixon in his treatise on 
international law: “[I]t is a matter of principle that states cannot avoid legal 
obligations once they have come into being.”230 
There are several problems with this argument. First, like the reliance 
argument, it is circular. If a right of withdrawal is built into the law, then it 
does not undermine the rule of law to exercise that right. Second, treaties are 
not considered to be less law-like than CIL, and yet they frequently include a 
right of withdrawal.231 Third, most international law in the nineteenth century 
was CIL, not treaty law, but many commentators thought that there was a 
right to withdraw from at least some portions of CIL, and this was not viewed 
as contrary to the rule of law.232 
A version of the argument is that a movement away from the Mandatory 
View will destabilize the law because nations will withdraw from CIL whenever 
they conclude that it is inconsistent with their interests.233 On this view, if such 
ease of withdrawal is permitted, CIL becomes meaningless as a restraint on 
national action. This prediction, however, is questionable. 
As a threshold matter, the Default View would allow only prospective 
withdrawal. Nations would still be responsible for their past actions. 
Withdrawals would have to be planned and announced ahead of time, thereby 
reducing the scope for opportunistic exits. Moreover, a reasonable notice 
 
230.  MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (6th ed. 2007); see also, e.g., 
Waldock, supra note 141, at 52 (objecting to the idea of an opt-out right on the ground that 
“[e]ither there is an international legal order or there is not”). 
231.  See Helfer, supra note 1, at 1582. 
232.  On the views of the nineteenth-century commentators, see supra notes 61-76 and 
accompanying text. 
233.  This is the problem of opportunistic withdrawals. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 198-99 (2008); Vincy Fon & Franceso Parisi, Stability and 
Change in International Customary Law, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 279 (2009). 
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period might be imposed in situations in which reliance interests are at stake. 
As we have discussed, that is how the issue is handled in the treaty context. For 
example, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which address the treatment of 
various categories of individuals during wartime, are a prime candidate for 
opportunistic behavior.234 The Conventions, however, protect against 
opportunistic withdrawals by allowing denunciation only after a time delay of a 
year or, in situations in which hostilities are ongoing, after peace has been 
concluded.235 More generally, for treaties that allow for withdrawal by 
implication rather than by an express provision, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties provides that the default notice period is one year.236 In the 
treaty context, we are unaware of any sentiment among commentators that 
there is a problem of excessive withdrawal,237 and it is not clear why CIL 
should operate differently in this regard. 
Finally, to the extent that there are incentives to comply with international 
law, such as reputational considerations,238 those incentives will presumably 
continue to exist despite a right of withdrawal.239 In fact, reputational 
incentives to comply with international law might actually work better in a 
world with rights of withdrawal. As the literature on social norms has shown, 
reputational sanctions operate most effectively in settings where those involved 
engage in repeat transactions and have reliable information that enables them 
to distinguish “good” and “bad” types.240 To facilitate such evaluations, 
 
234.  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, art. 63, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
235.  See Helfer, supra note 1, at 1597 n.50. For a suggestion that states can solve the problem of 
opportunistic withdrawals from treaties by tailoring appropriate notice and waiting periods, 
see Barbara Koremenos & Allison Nau, Exit, No Exit, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
(forthcoming 2010) (on file with authors). 
236.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 56(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345.  
237.  See Helfer, supra note 1, at 1601-06 (noting the general perception among commentators 
that withdrawal from treaties occurs rarely and is not an issue worthy of much study). 
238.  For discussion of reputational incentives to comply with international law, see Rachel 
Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231 (2009); and Andrew T. 
Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823 (2002). For 
a more general discussion of theories about why nations comply with international law, see 
Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 
U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005). 
239.  See, e.g., Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A 
Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 533-34 (2009) (noting the likely 
reputational costs associated with withdrawing from bilateral investment treaties); Helfer, 
supra note 1, at 1591. 
240.  See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 25 (2000). The issue is “[to] distinguish a 
nation’s principled assertion of a right to withdraw from a relationship that has turned out 
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compliance with the rules of the system should send a reliable signal about 
whether a party is a potentially good or bad partner for the future. If the 
system of rules is viewed as generally effective and legitimate, then information 
that an individual actor has violated the rules will produce the inference that 
the violator is not a good type. However, if the system of rules is made of 
antiquated and inefficient rules that cannot be altered quickly to tackle changed 
circumstances, then even the good types may find it necessary to violate the 
rules, and violations will not produce a reliable signal of type. 
The latter scenario is what is likely to happen with CIL under the 
Mandatory View. Absent a right of withdrawal, nations cannot change even 
inefficient or outdated CIL rules without either obtaining agreement from 
other nations or violating the rules. As a result, it is understood under the 
Mandatory View that a normal route for changing CIL is through violating 
it.241 This means that violations of CIL will not necessarily signal that the 
violator is a bad actor. In fact, in some cases, the willingness to take the risk of 
being the first to violate an inefficient or outdated CIL rule may be taken by 
others as a positive signal about the violator. For example, the bombing of 
Serbia by NATO forces during the Kosovo operation was likely a violation of 
the international law (both treaty-based and customary) governing the use of 
force.242 Because international rules had developed without adequate 
consideration of the need for an exception for humanitarian interventions to 
stop genocide, however, the NATO countries felt it necessary to violate the 
rule. As Professor Brewster observed, the reputations of the NATO countries 
were probably enhanced, not diminished, by their rule violation.243 
As another illustration, consider again the hypothetical concerning the 
screening of diplomatic pouches. Under the Mandatory View, it is assumed 
that if a complete ban on screening pouches has become inefficient or outdated, 
the only way in which it can be modified is for a nation either to obtain the 
agreement of other nations or to violate the CIL rule and hope that other 
nations acquiesce. The violation of the ban on screening, under this view, does 
not necessarily signal that the violator is a bad actor. The reputational 
incentives to comply with the rule are therefore diminished. By contrast, if 
there were some ability to withdraw from the rule, nations would have an 
 
badly from an opportunistic attempt to appropriate benefits that were created for a collective 
good.” Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, 
and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1583 (1999). 
241.  See supra text accompanying note 35. 
242.  See, e.g., Cogan, supra note 36, at 190-91; Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist 
Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 488 (2006). 
243.  See Brewster, supra note 238, at 240. 
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option other than violating the rule, and their violations would provide a more 
reliable signal of bad behavior. At the same time, the ability to withdraw would 
likely give the nation more leverage to induce other nations to negotiate a new 
agreement, thereby reducing potential holdup problems. The option to 
withdraw would also give other nations comfort in entering new agreements 
because they would not have to fear being stuck should the rule turn out to be 
inefficient. 
In sum, under the Mandatory View, a violation of CIL does not inherently 
signal that the violator is a bad actor. This in turn diminishes the reputational 
incentive to comply with CIL. By contrast, if there were a right to withdraw 
from CIL rules, rule violations (in the absence of a withdrawal) would be more 
likely to be taken as a sign of bad behavior, and the reputational incentives to 
comply would be greater. 
One might ask why, in a world with the Default View, nations would not 
avoid this reputational pressure to comply by simply withdrawing from a CIL 
rule before violating it. Part of the answer is that, to the extent that CIL rules 
are viewed as legitimate and beneficial, there are reputational incentives not to 
withdraw from them. Moreover, such withdrawals are by definition public and 
observable. Truly bad actors are probably more likely to attempt to violate CIL 
rules quietly rather than invoke a right of withdrawal, in an effort to avoid the 
reputational costs of withdrawal. As a result, when such violations are detected, 
they are more likely to constitute reliable evidence of the bad character of the 
actor. 
In considering rule-of-law arguments for the Mandatory View, this is an 
appropriate place to return to an idea mentioned earlier: that CIL is less 
mandatory than current doctrine suggests.244 The argument here is that, in 
light of the vague and amorphous nature of CIL, and the lack of centralized 
enforcement or adjudicative institutions, nations have a de facto ability to exit 
from CIL rules by contesting the rules or arguing that the rules do not cover 
particular fact scenarios. 
While there is almost certainly some truth to this account of CIL, it works 
at cross-purposes with rule-of-law arguments in favor of the Mandatory View. 
This account comes close to suggesting that CIL is simply a form of “law talk” 
that does not itself constrain state behavior—a position that supporters of the 
Mandatory View would, we suspect, resist. In any event, the account is 
overbroad, in that CIL rules vary substantially in their specificity, and there are 
at least sometimes adjudicative or enforcement mechanisms available to apply 
CIL (including, for example, domestic courts). The ability of nations to engage 
 
244.  See supra note 33. 
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in de facto exit is also likely to be biased in favor of those nations that have 
more power and resources, including access to sophisticated lawyers. 
Importantly, a system that allows for de jure as opposed to de facto exit is 
more consonant with rule-of-law values. Most obviously, de jure exit operates 
within the domain of law whereas de facto exit allows for an evasion of the 
law.245 In addition, a system that allows de jure exit enhances information flow 
because this type of exit will be express and public and thus can reveal 
information.246 By contrast, in a system that permits easy de facto exit (where 
de jure exit is prohibited), nations have an incentive to conceal information so 
that it is less likely that their actions will be perceived as a breach of the rule. In 
a sense, allowing nations the option of de jure exit gives the nations that would 
otherwise want to hide their violations an incentive to reveal information about 
their actions. As discussed earlier in Section IV.B, one of the mechanisms for 
international law enforcement is reputation, and the availability of good 
information is crucial for any reputation-based system to work. A system of 
vague laws that allows all but the most extreme violators to argue credibly that 
they are complying, and does not provide an incentive for the disclosure of 
noncomplying conduct, ends up revealing little information.247 
Allowing for lawful exit rights under CIL might also enhance treaty-
making. As discussed above, multilateral treaties are often invoked today as 
evidence of the content of CIL.248 This creates an anomaly, however, whereby 
nations frequently have a right to exit from the underlying treaties but not 
from the similar CIL derived from the treaties. This anomaly in turn increases 
the “sovereignty costs” associated with establishing and joining multilateral 
 
245.  Cf. Helfer, supra note 1, at 1587 (“Particularly given the international legal system’s relatively 
anarchic environment, in which surreptitious shirking of treaty commitments is often 
plausible, a state’s decision to follow the rules of the game, publicize a future withdrawal, 
and open itself to scrutiny demonstrates a kind of respect for international law.”). 
246.  Similarly, in the treaty context, the use of reservations and derogation clauses can enhance 
information flow. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 335-38 
(2006) (reservations); Emilie Hafner-Burton, Laurence R. Helfer & Christopher J. Fariss, 
Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties (June 9, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1622732 (derogation 
clauses). 
247.  Allowing lawful exit as an alternative to surreptitious violation may also increase the 
likelihood that states will be socialized toward law compliance. Cf. Ryan Goodman & Derek 
Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 621, 668-69 (2004) (discussing this possibility in connection with derogation clauses in 
human rights treaties). 
248.  See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. 
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treaties.249 By contrast, allowing for exit rights under CIL would reduce these 
costs and thereby potentially encourage more treatymaking. In addition, a 
nation seeking to withdraw from a CIL rule would need to announce this 
intention publicly, thereby potentially placing the issue on the international 
agenda for discussion and negotiation, something that is less likely to happen 
when a nation simply dissembles about its true position. 
C. Externalities and Agency Problems 
Having addressed the two arguments we have found in the literature in 
favor of the Mandatory View, we now develop two additional arguments that 
offer somewhat stronger support for that View: the problem of interstate 
externalities and the danger that governments will be unfaithful agents for 
their populations. As we explain, these arguments provide support for limiting 
opt-out under certain circumstances, but they do not support the conclusion 
that all of CIL should be subject to the Mandatory View. 
1. Externalities 
Many activities that nations engage in, such as waging war, polluting the 
atmosphere, manipulating their currency values, or financing international 
terrorism, impose externalities on others. Globalization has heightened the 
likelihood that one nation’s actions—for example, in dealing with an internal 
financial crisis—can generate global effects. A chief target of international law, 
therefore, is conduct that generates interstate externalities. Such international 
law might seem to be a prime candidate for the Mandatory View, in that 
nations might be tempted to exit CIL rules when they are able to externalize 
costs of activities on others.250 
As an initial matter, it is important to keep in mind that this externalities 
argument can at best offer only partial support for the Mandatory View. Many 
types of state conduct, especially conduct carried out within a nation’s territory, 
will not necessarily produce substantial externalities. Moreover, externalities 
will often be sufficiently distributed or insignificant such that they will not 
 
249.  The term “sovereignty costs” refers to “the symbolic and material costs of diminished 
national autonomy.” Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, 
and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 375 (1999); see 
also, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in 
Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 227 (2000) (defining “sovereignty cost” as “the surrender 
of national discretion”). 
250.  See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (1993). 
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provide an appropriate justification for legal constraints. Basic Coasean 
bargaining also teaches us that, even when externalities are significant or 
unevenly distributed, they may not by themselves provide a justification for the 
Mandatory View, particularly when transaction costs are low and parties can 
negotiate over the externalities.251 It is possible, therefore, that the best solution 
to some international externalities is simply to have the affected parties 
negotiate a solution with the externality-producing nation. 
In any event, there is a broader problem with linking the Mandatory View 
to externalities: it assumes that the requisite state practice and opinio juris will 
develop to address situations in which nations impose nonreciprocal and 
substantial externalities. This assumption, however, is doubtful. Consider the 
international law prohibition on waging aggressive war. This prohibition was 
established after two horrific world wars confirmed the externalities that can be 
generated by this conduct. The Mandatory View thus might seem to make 
sense for this prohibition. Importantly, though, CIL was not viewed as an 
effective means of regulating the problem of aggressive war. Instead, it was 
regulated in the U.N. Charter, a treaty that has been ratified by essentially all 
nations of the world.252 Further, this treaty establishes an international 
institution—the Security Council—that has unique authority to enforce 
compliance with the Charter, even through the authorization of military force 
against the violating nation. Alas, even the U.N. Charter framework has proven 
insufficient for regulating the issue, as countless wars of various scope (albeit 
not on a worldwide scale) have been waged since the Charter was established 
in 1945. 
Other examples of modern externalities are consistent with this conclusion. 
Consider four of the most pressing problems of the day: global warming, the 
proliferation of small arms, financial contagion, and terrorist financing. It 
seems unlikely that these issues can be adequately addressed by CIL. Absent 
monitoring and verification systems, nations have an incentive to cheat and 
free ride on the efforts of others. Further, if there are enough nations that 
benefit from imposing externalities on others, they will resist the attempts of 
others to constrain them, at least absent some inducement, which itself may 
require collective action. This is why, in the global warming context, there has 
been so much effort to establish a comprehensive treaty, such as the Kyoto 
 
251.  See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 13-14 (3d ed. 
2003); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 49-52 (6th ed. 2003). 
252.  See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
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Protocol.253 In the case of financial contagion, the efforts toward setting up 
rules or principles of responsible sovereign behavior are only beginning to be 
considered by international treaty-based bodies such as the IMF, the Paris 
Club, the World Bank, and United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).254 In the case of small arms proliferation, efforts 
toward producing an international treaty via the United Nations have been 
ongoing, but slow.255 Much the same story can be told regarding terrorist 
financing. Progress has been made not through CIL, but rather through 
binding resolutions of the Security Council and various treaties.256 The point is 
that in none of these cases has CIL been able to generate effective rules to 
constrain misbehavior. 
The academic literature on collective action problems lends support to the 
foregoing discussion.257 For our purposes, two basic points emerge from this 
literature. First, collective action problems are harder to solve when groups 
become larger, interactions become fewer, and heterogeneity becomes 
greater.258 Misbehavior becomes harder to detect, and enforcement via informal 
sanctions becomes more difficult to implement. Second, while medium-sized 
groups may sometimes be able to devise solutions to collective action 
problems, it is unlikely that such solutions will arise spontaneously out of 
 
253.  See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
203 (2010) (“[T]he elaboration of specific rules of behavior (for example, to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions, hazardous materials, or trade in endangered species) has 
proceeded through purposive negotiations, resulting in a treaty or other type of agreed 
instrument.”). 
254.  On UNCTAD’s efforts along these lines, which involve a collaborative project with the other 
international organizations mentioned in the text, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing (UNCTAD Project No. 198, Nov. 2009). 
255.  See Asif Efrat, Toward Internationally Regulated Goods: Controlling the Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons, 64 INT’L ORG. 97, 98-100 (2010). 
256.  See, e.g., Ilias Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 315 
(2003). 
257.  See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS (1971); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 
162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
258.  See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 257, at 1-35 (noting that as the size of a group increases, the 
ability to monitor goes down and the cost of bargaining goes up); OSTROM, supra note 257, 
at 183-84 (pointing out the difficulty of solving collective action problems in large groups 
where “no one communicates, everyone acts independently, no attention is paid to the 
effects of one’s actions, and the costs of trying to change the structure of the situation are 
high”). 
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unstructured interactions.259 In the international law literature, along these 
lines, much ink has been spilled over whether, in the absence of a leviathan, 
global collective action problems can be solved.260 Importantly, the implicit 
assumption in these discussions is that multilateral treaties would have to be 
negotiated first, and the debate then is over whether those treaties would work 
to constrain state behavior in a meaningful fashion.261 
The problem of externalities helps explain why some treaty regimes 
explicitly or implicitly restrict withdrawal. Boundary treaties provide a classic 
example, as they are presumed not to be subject to unilateral withdrawal.262 
Part of the likely explanation is the problem of reliance, discussed above, since 
nations will presumably take a variety of actions in reliance on an established 
border. But the other likely explanation is that, since intrusion on a nation’s 
territory has long been viewed as a justification for war, the externalities 
associated with unilateral withdrawal are high. Importantly, however, these 
arguments do not apply to all treaties, and—as we have discussed—many treaty 
regimes in fact permit unilateral withdrawal. 
2. Agency Problems 
Another argument for limiting opt-out of CIL rules is that the interests of 
governments will sometimes be contrary to the interests of their populations. 
That is, governments will want to opt out even though it would be better for 
their populations if they did not. 
As an initial matter, this agency argument for restricting national choice is 
too broad, in that it could suggest micromanaging all government decisions, or 
at least those made by nondemocracies. A foundational principle of 
international law (and sovereignty) has long been that governments are 
 
259.  For example, in Ostrom’s research on how mid-sized groups are able to solve collective 
action problems, she finds that successful solutions were a function of having agreements, 
monitoring regimes, and other institutional supports. See OSTROM, supra note 257, at 180. 
Similarly, Goldsmith and Posner suggest that customary law might help solve coordination 
problems, but that treaties are likely necessary to solve collective action problems. 
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 15, at 35-38. 
260.  See, e.g., ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT 
THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
261.  Cf. Norman & Trachtman, supra note 208 (arguing that CIL, under certain conditions, can 
evolve to solve collective action problems). 
262.  See AUST, supra note 3, at 290, 299. 
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allowed to make even bad decisions across a wide array of issue areas.263 If a 
government decides to adopt a planned rather than free market economy or to 
stay out of a free trade treaty regime, international law will have nothing to say, 
even though the decision, in hindsight, may turn out to be detrimental to the 
well-being of the population. 
There may be situations, however, in which we can be confident, ex ante, 
that the interests of governments and populations will diverge, and where the 
moral considerations are so strong that they override the usual deference to 
national governments. Much of international human rights law might be 
thought of in these terms, in that it seeks to protect populations against abusive 
or discriminatory actions of their own governments. An illustration of this 
rationale is the position of the U.N. Human Rights Committee that nations do 
not have the right to withdraw unilaterally from the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.264 After North Korea announced in 1997 that it was 
withdrawing from the Covenant, the Committee issued a General Comment 
concluding that there is no withdrawal right under the Covenant because, 
among other things, “[t]he rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the 
people living in the territory of the State party” and therefore the protection of 
the Covenant “devolves with territory and continues to belong to them, 
notwithstanding change in government of the State party.”265 
Assuming this reasoning is persuasive, it is limited to international law that 
is focused on certain fundamental rights of individuals (such as jus cogens 
norms), rather than on more traditional interstate issues. While human rights 
law has become an important component of modern international law, it is 
only one component, and the extent to which it is governed by CIL rather than 
by treaty is the subject of debate.266 Thus, by itself, this agency problem does 
not explain the Mandatory View, which purports to describe all of CIL. As 
noted above, the mere fact that a decision affects the welfare of a population 
has not typically been thought to be a sufficient reason to disable government 
 
263.  See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 45, at 12 & n.* (noting that “[f]or centuries what transpired 
between a state and its inhabitants, as once between prince and subject, was no other state’s 
business,” and that, despite the modern rise of international human rights law, 
“impermeability is still a general characteristic of statehood”). 
264.  For a discussion, see Elizabeth Evatt, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the ICCPR: 
Denunciation as an Exercise of the Right of Self-Defence?, AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS., Jan. 1999, at 
215, 219-20. 
265.  Human Rts. Comm., Gen. Comment on Issues Relating to the Continuity of Obligations to 
the Int’l Covenant on Civil & Pol. Rts., ¶ 4, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997); 
CCPR Gen. Comment No. 26, Human Rts. Committee, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A153140 (VII) 
(Dec. 8, 1997), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm. 
266.  See, e.g., Simma & Alston, supra note 24. 
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control over the decision. Moreover, many treaties relate to the welfare of 
populations but nevertheless expressly or implicitly permit withdrawal. 
It is also worth noting that there is little reason to believe that the 
Mandatory View was developed to address agency problems. As discussed 
earlier in the Article, although we cannot pinpoint the precise time at which the 
Mandatory View became entrenched, it had likely become the prevailing view 
among commentators by the early portion of the twentieth century. By 
contrast, the view that international law had much to say about the internal 
governance of states, and particularly issues of basic human rights, did not gain 
traction until at least the middle of the twentieth century, after the horrors of 
World War II.267 It is unlikely, therefore, that perceptions of the agency 
problem were driving the emergence of the Mandatory View of CIL. 
D. Penalty Default 
In Part IV, we discussed some of the inefficiencies that are likely associated 
with the Mandatory View. It might be argued that these inefficiencies actually 
provide a reason for adhering to the Mandatory View—namely, that when they 
are combined with the disallowance of unilateral opt-out, these inefficiencies 
give states an incentive to negotiate treaties to override CIL. Such treatymaking 
should be encouraged, the argument might go, because it will result in more 
clearly defined obligations that are better tailored to state preferences and 
better able to address collective action problems. This argument envisions the 
Mandatory View as what is called in contract theory a “penalty default.”268 A 
penalty default is “purposefully set at what the parties would not want,”269 in 
order to encourage the parties to act in a socially optimal fashion.270 
There are a number of problems with this penalty-default conception of the 
Mandatory View. Most significantly, penalty defaults work only when the cost 
of contracting around them is less than the cost of sticking with the default.271 
Negotiating treaties, particularly multilateral ones, is often expensive, time-
consuming, and sometimes simply not feasible due to heterogeneous state 
 
267.  See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 36 (2009) (“The most striking fact about the international law of 
human rights is its nearly complete absence prior to the end of World War II.”). 
268.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
269.  Id. at 91. 
270.  See id. at 92-95. 
271.  See id. at 93. 
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preferences. Indeed, this is one of the central arguments for retaining CIL 
today as an independent body of international law.272 Moreover, because of the 
time needed to negotiate treaties, the benefits often accrue to later governments 
rather than to the government that does the hard work of developing the 
treaty. Individual governments, therefore, often have an incentive to adhere to 
inefficient custom, even though it would be better for the system (and this 
nation, in the long run) to negotiate treaties. In these circumstances, the high 
cost of movement out of the status quo acts as a trap, which is the opposite of 
what a penalty default aims to achieve. 
In addition, the Mandatory View applies across the board to all issues of 
CIL. Penalty defaults, however, are used only rarely and selectively in areas of 
domestic law. Indeed, some commentators argue that there are few or no real 
penalty defaults, and no one asserts that there is a widespread use of them.273 
Instead, most default rules are “majoritarian” in that they generally try to come 
close to what the parties would have agreed to if they had bargained over the 
issue.274 It is unlikely, therefore, that the use of a penalty default can be 
justified across an entire system of law, such as CIL, that covers a broad and 
diverse range of issues. 
An alternate form of the penalty argument might be that the prospect of 
restricted opt-out rights forces nations and publicists to be extremely careful, 
ex ante, both in proposing new forms of CIL and in policing the proposals 
made by others. Absent the penalty, an excess of proposals for new CIL rules 
might emerge and the incentives to police them might be diminished. This is a 
legitimate concern, but, as explained in Part I, the problem of excessive claims 
about CIL probably already exists as a result of the uncertainties surrounding 
CIL formation, in which case exit rights would work to alleviate a current 
problem. On the other hand, if one thought that CIL is sufficiently restrained 
today by its doctrinal requirements (sufficient state practice, opinio juris, etc.), 
then it is not clear why these doctrinal restraints would no longer work if there 
were some withdrawal rights. In any event, for reasons discussed above, 
increasing CIL innovation might actually be a positive development, since 
there are reasons to believe that CIL currently has difficulty addressing modern 
international problems. 
 
272.  See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. 
273.  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 563 (2006); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 594-609 (2003) (suggesting that, for contracts among sophisticated 
parties, there are few default rules in practice, let alone ones that have universal application). 
274.  See Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 
597 (2006).  
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E. Differences Between Treaties and CIL 
This Article began by comparing the withdrawal rights under treaties and 
CIL. A defender of the Mandatory View might note that there are differences 
between these two types of international law. While this is obviously true, the 
ultimate question is whether those differences explain the differential 
withdrawal rights. 
One potentially relevant difference between treaties and CIL is that some 
treaties involve a package of rules bundled together, such that a nation may be 
forced to give up the entire package as a cost of withdrawal. CIL, by contrast, 
consists of discrete rules. As a result, the argument might go, it will not be as 
costly for nations to exit from CIL, and this will create a danger of excessive 
withdrawals. 
As explained above, there are a variety of reasons to conclude that the 
concern about excessive withdrawals is overstated, and only one of these 
reasons concerns the analogy to treaties. In any event, treaties vary 
substantially in the extent to which they involve a package of rules. To take one 
example, in 2005 the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, a treaty that has essentially only 
one rule—consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the International Court of 
Justice over a certain category of cases.275 Moreover, we are unaware of 
evidence suggesting that the withdrawal rights in treaties differ as a function of 
the extent to which they contain a package of rules. 
The package-oriented treaties also present less of an “either/or” choice than 
one might assume. For example, nations are frequently allowed to attach 
reservations to their ratification of treaties and thereby accept only part of the 
package.276 In theory, nations might even have the ability to withdraw from a 
treaty and then reenter the treaty regime with a new set of reservations, 
although this idea is controversial.277 In addition, some package-oriented 
treaties also contain mini-opt-out rights or “safety valves” that allow a nation 
to stay within the treaty regime while opting out of particular provisions. One 
example is the derogation provision found in some human rights treaties that 
allows nations to avoid being bound by certain restrictions in the treaty during 
 
275.  See Frederic L. Kirgis, Addendum to ASIL Insight, President Bush’s Determination Regarding 
Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention Rights, ASIL INSIGHTS (Mar. 2005), 
http://www.asil.org/insights050309a.cfm. 
276.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336-37; 
supra note 164 and accompanying text.  
277.  See AUST, supra note 3, at 159-60; Laurence R. Helfer, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, 
Risk, and Treaty Design, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 367, 371-72 (2006). 
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times of emergency.278 A further example is Article XIX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which allows nations to suspend trade 
obligations with respect to a product when, as a result of unforeseen 
developments, “any product is being imported into the territory of that 
contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to 
cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like 
or directly competitive products.”279 
Another potentially relevant difference between treaties and CIL is that 
treaties are negotiated and usually written down. That process allows careful 
construction of tailored withdrawal provisions. CIL, by contrast, arises out of a 
more amorphous process, with the aggregation of state practice and opinio juris 
over time. As a result, it could be argued, there will inherently be less clarity in 
withdrawal rights for CIL than for treaties. 
As an initial matter, it should be recalled that some treaty withdrawal rights 
are implicit rather than explicit.280 In any event, the argument that it is better 
to have issues like this one regulated through express treaty provisions proves 
too much, since it would indict all of the secondary rules governing the 
formation and application of CIL, including the persistent objector doctrine. 
Nevertheless, there may be a need to craft limitations and variations on CIL 
withdrawal rights. These limitations and variations might be drawn from 
treaties that address the same subject matter as the CIL rule (such as a 
particular notice period), or interpreters could rely on a standards-based 
approach that (as with certain other areas of international law) considers what 
is reasonable under the circumstances.281 As with all developments in CIL, 
these refinements could be promoted through a variety of channels, including 
national pronouncements and international adjudication. 
Furthermore, the vagueness of CIL withdrawal rights might produce 
benefits. In particular, a nation seeking to exit from a CIL rule would need to 
announce not only the fact of exit, but also the rule from which it was exiting. 
 
278.  See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. 
EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
279.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XIX, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194; see also, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis 
of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 256 (1991) 
(“Article XIX is also often termed the GATT ‘escape clause,’ as it allows signatories to 
‘escape’ from their GATT commitments.”). 
280.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
281.  See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 
I.C.J. 392, 419-20 (Nov. 26) (requiring reasonable notice prior to withdrawal from 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and also applying a six months’ 
notice provision contained in the U.S. consent to jurisdiction). 
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In doing so, nations would clarify their views about the content of CIL and 
probably also the reasons why they did not want to continue operating under 
the particular rule. Such clarification might be particularly useful given the 
many uncertainties that surround the process of CIL formation, as discussed in 
Part I. 
Another potential distinction between treaties and CIL is that allowing 
withdrawal rights under CIL might create greater gaps in the law than would 
withdrawal rights under treaties. The argument would be that, under the 
Mandatory View of CIL, when a nation withdraws from a treaty, it is still 
potentially subject to background rules of CIL from which it cannot withdraw. 
Indeed, some treaties contain clauses specifically noting this fact, and it is 
stated as a more general proposition in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.282 If a nation could also exit from CIL, however, this might create 
complete gaps in international law. 
In fact, international law is far from a seamless web, and it is not 
uncommon to have gaps. As Professor Bodansky notes, “[O]ften, states differ 
and no rule gains acceptance one way or the other.”283 Many treaties are thus 
viewed as establishing international law that did not previously exist. 
Moreover, as illustrated by the Permanent Court of International Justice’s 
decision in the Lotus case, when a CIL norm does not restrict a nation’s actions, 
there is not a gap in the law but rather a background rule that allows for 
freedom of action.284 It is not self-evident that such freedom of action will 
always be bad for the international system. In situations in which it is 
problematic to allow for such freedom of action, one might expect that nations 
will have a strong incentive to develop a treaty to address the issue. Allowing 
withdrawal rights under CIL might increase the incentive for such treaty 
 
282.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 43, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 342 
(stating that withdrawal from a treaty “shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to 
fulfill any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under international 
law independently of the treaty”).  
283.  Daniel Bodansky, Non Liquet and the Incompleteness of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 153, 164-65 (Laurence 
Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999). 
284.  See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 19 (Sept. 7) (“Far from laying 
down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of their 
laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, 
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cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the 
principles which it regards as best and most suitable.”); see also MICHAEL J. GLENNON, 
LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO 63 (2001) 
(“International law has a doctrine that addresses legal uncertainty—a rule for no rules. It 
derives from the famed Lotus Case, and it is called the ‘freedom principle.’”). 
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negotiation, since it will be less likely that nations will muddle along with a 
less-than-ideal CIL rule. 
Finally, in addition to these specific differences, one might argue that CIL 
and treaties rest on different theoretical foundations. For example, the 
argument might be that CIL does not rest on the same assumptions about the 
need for state consent, or (relatedly) that CIL is more akin to mandatory 
domestic public law (such as criminal law) than to voluntary contracts. The 
problem with this argument is that it does not by itself explain why CIL and 
treaties are different in this respect, or whether this difference justifies the 
Mandatory View. Rather, this argument simply invites the question that we 
have been addressing in the last two Parts of the Article, which is whether it is 
desirable for CIL to have an exit regime that is significantly more mandatory 
than treaty law. In any event, there are some obvious differences between CIL 
and mandatory domestic public law, most notably the lack of a central 
sovereign with authority to develop and apply the rules of CIL.285 
F. Developing a Typology 
While this Article has made the functional case for expanding the 
opportunities for states to opt out of existing CIL, it has not attempted to 
develop a typology that would match more or less permissive opt-out rules to 
particular areas of CIL—something that would require a separate project. Our 
analysis does suggest, however, some general guidelines that would be relevant 
in developing such a typology. Consistent with a recurring theme of the 
Article, such a typology might consider patterns in treaty withdrawal clauses, 
which provide direct evidence of state preferences regarding the propriety of 
opt-out provisions. In addition, our analysis suggests that a typology should 
take account of the functional cooperation problems that different areas of CIL 
attempt to solve, some of which are likely to require more mandatory regimes 
than others. For example, areas of CIL that address significant agency 
problems, such as jus cogens norms of human rights, are likely to be prime 
candidates for the Mandatory View. By contrast, areas of CIL where 
externalities are low and prewithdrawal notice adequately addresses concerns 
about reliance, such as with respect to certain immunity doctrines, might be 
prime candidates for expansive opt-out rights. 
 
285.  We discuss additional reasons to question the analogy between CIL and mandatory 
domestic public law in Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and 
Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. (forthcoming 2010) (on 
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It probably also makes sense to treat certain structural or background 
principles as mandatory. In the treaty area, for example, there is no right of 
opt-out of the pacta sunt servanda principle, whereby nations are required to 
comply with treaty obligations in good faith (subject to whatever withdrawal 
rights are available under the treaty).286 Similarly, even under a Default View 
of CIL, there might often be a requirement of notice, and there would not be a 
right to opt out of that requirement. More generally, some aspects of 
international law, such as the concept of a nation-state, may have a 
“constitutional” character that depends on a more mandatory approach, 
because those aspects are necessary in order for the system to operate. As 
Professor Henkin has noted, however, “Such inter-state constitutional law is 
not ‘customary law’ in any meaningful sense relevant to an appreciation and 
understanding of the ‘sources’ of international law today.”287 Perhaps similar 
systemic arguments can be made for restricting exit from foundational 
organizations such as the United Nations.288 These arguments, however, 
would not apply to the vast bulk of CIL rules that simply regulate particular 
substantive issues. 
Importantly, such a typology might involve making certain CIL rules more 
mandatory than under the current one-size-fits-all approach to withdrawal. 
Under the Mandatory View, nations may avoid becoming bound by any CIL 
rule before it forms through persistent objection, and they may override any 
CIL rule between themselves by entering into a treaty. By contrast, under a 
system in which the exit rules were linked to the functions of the particular 
type of CIL, rules aimed at solving agency or externality problems might not 
allow for opt-outs via either the persistent objector doctrine or through 
individual treaties with other nations. Imagine, for example, a CIL rule against 
the use of a certain type of industrial chemical that caused significant harm to 
the atmosphere. Because such a rule would be designed to protect against 
externalities, it might make sense to disallow opt-out even through persistent 
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objection or side agreements.289 As a result, a functional approach to exit rules, 
while making exit from CIL easier in some instances, might also make it more 
difficult in other cases. 
conclusion 
As we made clear at the outset, this Article’s goal is not to challenge CIL’s 
legitimacy but rather to better understand it. Consistent with that goal, we are 
writing primarily for scholars and students of international law, both in the 
United States and around the world. Our hope is to begin a discussion about 
why the Mandatory View developed and whether, for some categories of CIL, a 
Default View might be more appropriate. 
While there are many puzzling features of CIL, its blanket disallowance of 
any subsequent opt-out right is particularly striking in light of the widespread 
withdrawal rights available under treaty law. This feature becomes more 
remarkable considering the substantial overlap today between treaties and CIL, 
both in terms of the subjects that they regulate and in terms of the content of 
their rules. The intellectual history of CIL further complicates the picture by 
showing that many prominent international law publicists in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries thought that at least some rules of CIL allowed for a 
subsequent opt-out, a fact that is not mentioned in any of the current 
casebooks or treatises on international law. We have presented this history not 
out of any nostalgia for the international law of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, but to show that the Mandatory View, which has its own 
problematic history, is not the only way to think about CIL. Moreover, while 
the Mandatory View became conventional wisdom among commentators in 
the twentieth century, both state practice and the development of the persistent 
objector doctrine raise questions about the extent to which that View has 
become a settled feature of international relations. In light of the Mandatory 
View’s complicated historical foundations, it is particularly appropriate to 
consider the extent to which this View is functionally justified. Although it is 
possible to formulate functional arguments for restricting opt-out rights under 
CIL, it is difficult to conclude from these arguments that such restrictions 
should apply across the board to all of CIL, especially in light of the 
inefficiencies that such a mandatory regime is likely to generate. 
 
289.  For an argument along these lines, see Charney, supra note 250. 
